Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 61

Issue 1

Article 4

January 1985

Implementing the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act
Martin H. Malin
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Martin H. Malin, Implementing the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act, 61 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 101
(1985).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol61/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

IMPLEMENTING THE ILLINOIS EDUCATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT
MARTIN

H. MALIN*

On January 1, 1984, the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act'
(IELRA) took effect. The IELRA, together with the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (IPLRA) 2 which took effect July 1, 1984, is the first
comprehensive statutory regulation of public sector collective bargaining
in Illinois history. In many respects the IELRA is similar to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which regulates collective bargaining in the private sector, and to statutes in other jurisdictions which
regulate collective bargaining in the public sector. The IELRA grants to
educational employees the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection and the
right to refrain from such activities, protects these rights by prohibiting
employer and union unfair labor practices, provides for representation
elections to determine employee choices concerning exclusive bargaining
representatives, and establishes the Illinois Educational Labor Relations
Board (IELRB) to administer the Act.
The IELRA is also innovative in several respects. It deliberately
does not follow the general private sector definitions of supervisors and
managerial employees who are excluded from statutory coverage; it provides procedures for employer voluntary recognition of employee organizations; and, unlike most other jurisdictions in the public sector, it relies
primarily on mediation and the parties' abilities to use economic weapons
to resolve collective bargaining impasses.
During the Act's first year, the IELRB promulgated extensive rules
and regulations implementing it. 3 Although these regulations are primarily procedural, they reflect underlying substantive policy determina* Associate Professor, lIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. J.D., George Washington University, B.A., Michigan State University. The author served as consultant to the Illinois Educational,
State and Local Labor Relations Boards and was the principal drafter of their initial regulations.
The views expressed in this article are the author's and not necessarily the views of the Boards. The
author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Anthony John Pankau, Jr., lIT ChicagoKent class of 1985.
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,

1701-1727 (Supp. 1983) (Public Act 83-1014).

2.

1601-1627 (Supp. 1983) (Public Act 83-1012).

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,

3. 80 111. Adm. Code §§ 1100-1130 (The provisions of the Illinois Administrative Code, which
as cited hereinafter refer to the IELRB rules, are published in final form in 8 Ill. Admin. Reg. 16300,
19413, 22538 & 22548 (1984)).
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tions. There are, however, many major issues that, while important for
the overall implementation of the Act, are not addressed by the rules.
This article analyzes the IELRB's regulations and focuses on the
major issues that they do not address. It discusses the rationale for a
separate statute governing labor relations in the education sector and
draws on this rationale, comparisons with the IPLRA and the NLRA,
and legislative history to suggest approaches to many of the issues that
the IELRB, the courts and the parties will face as the new law is developed in the coming years.
THE RATIONALE FOR A SEPARATE EDUCATION LABOR ACT

As initially passed by the legislature, the IPLRA's coverage included public education. The legislature also passed the IELRA at approximately the same time. The governor used his amendatory veto 4 to

delete public education from the IPLRA's coverage and approved the
IELRAwith certain modifications. Thus, in contrast to most other jurisdictions, 5 collective bargaining in Illinois public education is covered by a
separate statute, administered by a separate agency. This separation of
public education from the rest of the public sector "recognizes that substantial differences exist between educational employees and other public
employees as a result of the uniqueness of the educational work calendar
and educational work duties and the traditional and historical patterns of
collective bargaining...,,6

A comparison of the IELRA with the IPLRA reveals that the two
acts differ primarily with respect to the timing of representation proceed4. Illinois is one of a few states in which the Governor has amendatory veto power. The
Governor may veto an entire bill under his traditional veto powers. See Ill. Const., art. IV, § 9(b).
The legislature may override such a veto by a three-fifths vote of each house. The Governor's
amendatory veto power, Id. § 9(e), requires that he return the bill to the house in which it originated
with specific recommendations for change. Each house may accept the recommendations by simple
majority vote. The Governor may then certify that the acceptance conforms to the recommendations, thereby allowing the bill to become law.
5. In most other jurisdictions collective bargaining in public education is governed by the
general public labor relations statute. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, §§ 1-15 (West
1982 & Supp. 1984-85); MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.201-423.216 (West 1978 & Supp. 198485); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.01-179.25 (West 1966 & Supp. 1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13A-1
to 34:13A-21 (West 1984); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §§ 200-215 (McKinney 1983); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 4117.01 to 4117.23 (Page Supp. 1983). In some jurisdictions, public education is covered
by a separate statute which is administered by the same agency that administers the general public
labor relations statute. See, e.g., CALIF. GOV'T CODE §§ 3546-3549.3; 3560-3599 (West 1980 &
Supp. 1985). In Washington, public school employees are subject to the jurisdictions of the Public
Employment Relations Commission, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 41.59.010-41.59.150 (Supp. 1985),
while higher education employees are subject to the jurisdiction of the Higher Education Personnel
Board, Id. at § 28B.16.100.
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
1701 (Supp. 1983).
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ings, collective bargaining and impasse resolution. With respect to representation proceedings, both statutes establish a contract bar, which
provides that whenever a collective bargaining agreement of up to three
years duration is in effect, representation petitions must be filed at a designated time prior to the contract's expiration date. However, where the
IPLRA permits the filing of a representation petition sixty to ninety days
prior to the expiration date of the contract, the IELRA sets this "window
period" at January 15th through March 1st of the year in which the
contract expires. The IELRA also provides that a representation election "shall be held no later than ninety days after the date the petition
7
was filed." No comparable provision is found in the IPLRA.
With respect to collective bargaining and impasse resolution, the IPLRA in most cases merely requires that a party notify the other party of
its desire to terminate or modify the collective bargaining agreement
sixty days prior to the agreement's expiration date, and that the parties
notify the Illinois State or Local Labor Relations Board of the existence
of a dispute within thirty days after the first notice.8 The IELRA's notice provisions are more elaborate. The parties must notify the IELRB of
the status of negotiations ninety days prior to the scheduled start of the
forthcoming school year. Within forty-five days of the scheduled start of
the forthcoming school year the IELRB may initiate mediation on its
own motion or on petition of a party. The Board must invoke mediation
fifteen days before the scheduled start of the school year. 9
The timetables contained in the IELRA envision the following scenario: A representation petition is filed between January 15th and March
1st, resulting in an election being held no later than May 29th, with certification to follow by the first week in June. The representation procedure
is thus concluded in early June, which is approximately ninety days prior
to the scheduled start of the next school year. The parties are then in a
position to enter the bargaining phase of the relationship and to file their
ninety-day notice. Under this scenario, representation proceedings and
collective bargaining are to be conducted in such a manner as to maximize the probability that they will be settled by the scheduled start of the
upcoming school year.
Unfortunately, the scenario can easily break down in several ways.
First, if employees are not currently represented by an employee organization, a representation petition can be filed at anytime because there is
7. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
1707(c)(2) (Supp. 1983).

1609(h) (Supp. 1983) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,

8.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,

1607 (Supp. 1983).

9.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,

1712 (Supp. 1983).
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no existing contract to bar it. This can result in an election being held
considerably prior to or after late May.
Second, there will be cases in which it will be physically impossible
to hold an election within ninety days following the filing of the representation petition. In elementary and secondary education, historical patterns of bargaining have resulted in relatively well defined bargaining
units. This is clearly not the case in higher education. Complex issues
such as whether a single campus bargaining unit is appropriate, whether
tenure track and nontenure track faculty should be included in the same
unit, whether nontenured professional employees should be included in a
faculty unit, and whether particular schools should be severed out of the
unit will likely arise and require considerably longer than ninety days to
resolve. 10

Third, the statutory timetable for bargaining will be meaningless in
many instances. For example, the hospital operated by the University of
Illinois is clearly subject to the IELRA. However, the hospital operates
year round and has no scheduled start of the school year. Although the
university with which it is affiliated has a school year, the hospital's operations are not timed to the academic calendar. Moreover, agencies subject to the IELRA, such as the Illinois State Board of Education and the
Illinois Scholarship Commission, simply have no school year.
Thus, it is clear that the statutory time lines cannot be literally applied. Moreover, in light of the wide variety of employment relationships
to which the IELRA applies, the legislature could not have intended a
literal application of the statutory time lines. Rather, the statutory time
lines provide a model illustrating the basic legislative intent that representation matters be concluded as expeditiously as possible and that
every effort be made to conclude collective bargaining by reaching agreement prior to the time when a failure to reach agreement is likely to be
most disruptive. This point will often be the scheduled start of the school
year, but it may frequently be other points in time.
STATUTORY COVERAGE

The IELRA covers educational employers and educational employees. "Educational employers" is defined by inclusion to mean public
school districts, community college districts, state colleges and universi10. See IELRB, Proposed Rules and Regulations Dealing with Representation and Unfair Labor Practice Procedures, Hearings on June 20, 1984, Chicago, pp. 75-77, 96-97 (hereafter cited as
Chicago Representation Rules Hearings); c.f New York University, 205 N.L.R.B. 4, 6 (1973) (issue
of excluding law school from general faculty bargaining unit).
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ties, and "any State agency whose major function is providing educational services." 1 This appears to include such agencies as the Illinois
2
State Board of Education and the Illinois Scholarship Commission.'
"Educational employee" is defined by exclusion to mean all employees except "supervisors, managerial, confidential, short-term employees,
student, and part-time academic employees of community colleges
S. .13 The Act expressly defines "supervisor," "managerial," "confidential" and "part-time academic community college employees" but
4
contains no express definition of "short-term" or "student employees."'
The IELRB rules simply reiterate the statutory definitions.' 5
As originally passed by the legislature, the IELRA's only express
exclusion was for supervisors. 16 Its definition of supervisor provided that
participation in academic decision making did not render an individual a
supervisor.' 7 This approach apparently was designed to insure that the
Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Yeshiva University'8 would not be
applied to public education in Illinois.
In Yeshiva, the Court held that faculty who participated in the academic governance of the university were managers and therefore were
excluded from the coverage of the National Labor Relations Act. The
1702(a) (Supp. 1983).
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
12. See 83rd Gen. Assem., House Committee on Elementary and Secondary Education, Hearings on May 6, 1983 (remarks of Representative Stuffle).
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, $ 1702(b) (Supp. 1983).
14. "Supervisor" means any individual having authority in the interests of the employer to
hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, reward or discipline other employees within the appropriate bargaining unit and adjust their grievances, or to effectively
recommend such action, if the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or
clerical nature but requires the use of independent judgment. The term "supervisor" includes only those individuals who devote a preponderance of their employment time to
such exercising authority.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, $ 1702(g) (Supp. 1983). "'Managerial employee means an individual who is
engaged predominantly in executive and management functions and is charged with the responsibility of directing the effectuation of such management policies and practices." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
1702(o) (Supp. 1983).
"Confidential employee" means an employee, who (i) in the regular course of his or
her duties, assists and acts in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine
and effectuate management policies with regard to labor relations or who (ii) in the regular
course of his or her duties has access to information relating to the effectuation or review of
the employer's collective bargaining policies.
1702(n) (Supp. 1983). "[P]art-time academic employees of community
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
colleges shall be defined as those employees who provide less than 6 credit hours of instruction per
academic semester." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1 1702(b) (Supp. 1983).
15. 80 11. Adm. Code § 1100.10.
16. H.B. 1530, as Enrolled, § 2(b).
17. [N]o employee or group of employees shall be deemed to be a "supervisor" because the
employee or group of employees participates in decisions with respect to courses, curriculum, personnel, or other matters of educational policy.
H.B. 1530, as Enrolled, § 2(9).
18. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
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NLRB had contended that faculty were not managers because they exercised their authority collectively in the interests of the faculty rather than
the interests of the employer. The Court rejected this position because it
viewed the interests of the faculty as identical to those of the employer.
The governor's amendatory veto substantially altered the IELRA's
definition of supervisor. It deleted the reference to participation in academic decision making and added a provision that defined supervisors to
be only those individuals who devote a preponderance of their employment time to supervisory duties.' 9 This language was taken from the
IPLRA. 20 It was inserted into that act on the House floor. The House
debates on the IPLRA indicate that the legislature intended to substitute
a percentage of employment time test for the Yeshiva analysis. 2 1 Similar
language is used in the definition of managerial employee, thereby indicating that a similar percentage of employment time test applies to that
exclusion. 22 Typical faculty members spend the preponderance of their
19. Governor's Amendatory Veto Message of House Bill 1530, pp. 2-3 (September 23, 1983).
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1603(q) (Supp. 1983).
21. Representative Davis argued against the definition because it was inconsistent with Yeshiva
and would result in employee status for department heads in high schools and universities. 83rd
Gen. Assem., House Debate on S.B. 536, pp. 285-86 (June 24, 1983). Shortly thereafter, Representative Greiman, one of the House sponsors of both the IPLRA and the IELRA, confirmed in a colloquy with Representative Hoffman that a chairman of a high school social studies department who
spends 80 percent of his employment time teaching and 20 percent with supervisory duties would be
an employee rather than a supervisor. Id. at 287-88. The legislative intent that a typical public
school or community college department chairman be considered an employee rather than a supervisor was reiterated during the Senate debates on the Governor's amendatory veto. 83rd Gen. Assem.,
Senate Debate on H.B. 1530, p. 61 (Nov. 2, 1983).
The percentage of time test differs significantly from the private sector approach to supervisory
status. Although an employee's infrequent and sporadic assumption of supervisory functions does
not result in supervisory status, a person with full-time supervisory authority remains a supervisor
even though that authority is exercised only occasionally. See generally, The Developing Labor Law
1455 (C. Morris ed. 1983). However, even in the private sector the percentage of time test is not
unknown. Professional employees who supervise nonbargaining unit employees are not considered
supervisors if their supervisory duties encompass less than 50 percent of their employment time. See,
e.g., New York University, 205 N.L.R.B. 4, 8 (1973); Adelphi University, 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972).
22. To be a managerial employee one must be engaged predominantly in management functions. See supra note 14. In contrast, the definition of confidential employee does not require a
preponderance or predominance of confidential activities over other job duties, but merely requires
that confidential activities occur in the regular course of employment. See id.
The managerial exception was viewed by the legislature as a very narrow exception. As explained by Senator Bruce:
On . . . managerial employees . . . I believe the Governor . . . in his definition made
it very clear that . . . it is not the title. It is the question of the preponderance of time that
the employee will spend in the question (sic) of management, and those people who would
be excluded from management are only those people who would be limited to what is
known as the central management team.
83rd Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on H.B. 1530, pp. 45-46 (Nov. 2, 1983).
The supervisory, managerial and confidential employee exceptions were intended collectively to
place management and labor on a more equal footing. See 83rd Gen. Assem., House Debate on S.B.
536, p. 291 (June 23, 1983); Governor's Amendatory Veto of H.B. 1530 at 1 (September 23, 1983)
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employment time on teaching, preparing for class, counseling students,
and, in the case of higher education faculty, conducting research. The
minor percentage of their time spent on academic governance matters
should not serve to deny them employee status.
A major issue that surfaced during the NLRB's brief experience
with private university faculty bargaining was the supervisory status of
department chairmen. 2 3 The NLRB held that department chairmen
were employees if they exercised their power in the interests of the
faculty, but were supervisors if they exercised their power in the interests
of the administration. This approach required the Board to delve into
the "complex threads, and even nuances, of the relationship among the
faculty, administration, and department chairmen .... ,,24 and produced seemingly contradictory results. 2 5 The IELRA obviates the need
for such inquiry, leaving the supervisory status of department chairmen
to be resolved by the objective percentage of employment time test.
The exclusion of student employees is perhaps the most perplexing
of the Governor's amendatory additions to the IELRA. Nowhere is
there any indication of the definition of "student employee" or of the
rationale for excluding such workers from coverage. 26 In the private
sector the NLRA does not expressly exclude student employees from its
coverage. The NLRB, however, has held that students employed by
their educational institutions are not employees subject to the Act's
27
coverage.
(describing changes as necessary "to create a workable and fair system that balances the rights of
educational employees with the unique managerial problems that beset educational employers").
23. See New York University, 205 N.L.R.B. 4, 9 (1973) ("In virtually every case since we
asserted jurisdiction over universities, the status of department chairmen, or heads, has been in
issue.").
24. Id.
25. Compare Fairleigh Dickinson University, 205 N.L.R.B. 673 (1973); Syracuse University,
204 N.L.R.B. 641 (1973); Adelphi University, 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1973) and C.w. Post Center, 189
N.L.R.B. 904 (1971) (department chairmen held to be supervisors) with Boston University v. NLRB,
575 F.2d 301 (1st Cir. 1978), vacated, 445 U.S. 912 (1980) (remanded for further consideration in
light of Yeshiva); New York University, 205 N.L.R.B. 4 (1973) and Fordham University, 193
N.L.R.B. 134 (1971) (department chairmen held to be employees). The NLRB's inconsistency was
criticized as a "disturbing and perhaps unseemly spectacle of a theoretically expert administrative
agency issuing alternatively perfunctory and contradictory decisions based wholly on one or another
of two differing precedents on the same question." Finkin, The N.L.R.B. in Higher Education, 5
TOLEDO L. REV. 608, 634-35 (1974).

26. Although "short-term" employee is not defined in the IELRA, it is defined in the IPLRA.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1603(p) (Supp. 1983). Part-time academic employees of community colleges is expressly defined and was added by the Governor in response to concerns voiced during the
legislative debates that statutory coverage of part-time instructors could have disasterous financial
consequences for community colleges. See 83rd Gen. Assem., House Debate on H.B. 1530, pp. 25960 (May 26, 1983).
27. St. Clare's Hosp. & Health Center, 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977) (hospital housestaft); Kansas
City Gen'l Hosp. & Medical Center, 225 N.L.R.B. 108 (1976) (hospital housestaff); Cedars-Sinai

CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW

The NLRB's approach focused on students' subjective motivation
for working. The NLRB reasoned that students are concerned primarily
with their studies and work only to support their studies. 28 Although it
initially recognized that "students" and "employees" were not mutually
exclusive categories, 29 the NLRB later concluded that it was not possible
for the same individual to be both a student and an employee. 30 Consequently, in the NLRB's view, student employment involved academic
concerns such as hours of study, program advancement, examinations,
grading, course content and materials, program duration and teaching
methods. Collective bargaining with regard to such matters was seen as
inconsistent with the inherently unequal student-teacher relationship. 3'
The NLRB's approach has been generally rejected in the public sector because it substitutes presumed subjective intention for objective indicia of employment status. Many states interpreting public sector labor
acts have relied on objective criteria to find that employees do not lose
their collective bargaining rights merely because they are also students at
the institutions that employ them. 32 Moreover, the NLRB's concern that
Medical Center, 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976) (hospital housestaff); San Francisco Art Institute, 226
N.L.R.B. 1251 (1976) (students employed as janitors); Leland Stanford Jr. University, 214 N.L.R.B.
621 (1974) (graduate assistants). For a history and critique of the NLRB's interpretation see Malin,
Student Employees and Collective Bargaining, 69 Ky. L. J. 1 (1980).
28. San Francisco Art Institute, 226 N.L.R.B. 1251 (1976).
29. Cedar-Sinai Medical Center, 223 N.L.R.B. 251, 253 (1976).
30. St. Clare's Hosp. & Health Center, 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1003 (1977).
31. Id. at 1002-03.
32. Student employees are usually considered employees for federal income tax purposes. See;
Parr v. United States, 469 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1972); Hembree v. United States, 464 F.2d 1262 (4th
Cir. 1972); Rundell v. Comm'r, 455 F.2d 639 (5th Cir. 1972); Wertzberger v. United States, 441 F.2d
1166 (8th Cir. 1971); Woodail v. Comm'r, 321 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1963); Rev. Rul. 75-490, 1975-2
C.B. 50; Rev. Rul. 72-469, 1972-2 C.B. 79; Rev. Rul. 68-520, 1968-2 C.B. 58; Rev. Rul. 65-117,
1965-1 C.B. 67; Rev. Rul. 57-386, 1957-2 C.B. 107; but see Leathers v. United States, 471 F.2d 856
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1972); workers' compensation; see Nordland v. Poor Sisters of
St. Francis, 4 III. App. 2d 48, 123 N.E.2d 121 (1954); Brewer's Case, 335 Mass. 601, 141 N.E.2d 281
(1957); Bernstein v. Beth Israel Hosp., 236 N.Y. 268, 140 N.E. 694 (1923). Student employees are
also employees for purposes of voter residency, see Rathbyn v. Smith, 175 Misc. 246, 23 N.Y.S.2d 95
(Sup. Ct. 1940); and the re-employment provisions of the selective service statute, see Martin v.
Roosevelt Hosp., 426 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1970). Student employees usually are assigned and paid on
the basis of employer need, work regular schedules and a substantial number of hours. Some or all
of these factors have been relied on in public sector decisions finding student employees within the
statutory definition of "employee". See, e.g., Long Beach Veterans Admin. Medical Center, 7
F.L.R.A. 434 (1981); City of Cambridge, No. MCR-2163 (Mass. L.R.C. 1976); University of Mich.
v. MERC, 389 Mich. 96, 204 N.W.2d 218 (1973); Michigan State Univ., 1976 M.E.R.C. 73; House
Officers Ass'n v. University of Neb. Medical Center, 198 Neb. 697, 255 N.W.2d 258 (1977); Long
Island College Hosp., 33 N.Y.S.L.R.B. 161 (1970); Arrowhead United Teachers Org., [1980] GOV'T
EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 877, at 14 (Wisc. ERC); see also Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 223
N.L.R.B. 251, 254-55 (1976) (Fanning, Member, dissenting); Wayne State Univ., 1969 M.E.R.C.
670, 671 (rejecting employer's contention that union composed entirely of student employees lacks
permanence, experience or strength necessary to be a labor organization); Contra, Philadelphia Ass'n
of Interns & Residents v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 470 Pa. 562, 369 A.2d 711 (1976).
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giving student employees collective bargaining rights will result in bargaining over academic matters has been shown to be empirically
3
incorrect. 3
In two states, the legislatures have expressly defined exclusions for
students employed by their educational institutions. In Florida, the Public Employment Relations Commission initially held that graduate assistants were employees under that state's Public Employment Relations
Act.3 4 The legislature reacted by amending the Act to expressly exclude
"[T]hose persons enrolled as graduate students in the state university system employed as graduate assistants . . . and those persons enrolled as
undergraduate students . . . who perform part-time work for the state

university system."' 35 Following this amendment, the Florida PERC re36
voked the certification of the graduate assistant bargaining units.

In California, the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations
Act (HEEERA) provides that student employees are covered "only if the
services they provide are unrelated to their educational objectives, or
• . . those educational objectives are subordinate to the services they perform and . . . coverage

. .

.

would further the [Act's] purposes .

. .- 37

California,38

In University of
the California Public Employment Relations Board held that hospital housestaff were covered by HEEERA.
The California PERB observed that services performed by housestaff
were related to their educational objectives, but found that those objectives were subordinate to the performance of those services. The Board
based this finding on evidence in the record that housestaff spent an average of eighty percent of their working time in clinical activities, frequently missed formal teaching sessions because their clinical
responsibilities were more important, provided direct patient care with
little or no supervision, supervised and guided other hospital employees
and medical students, and were clothed with the traditional objective indicia of employment.
The California Court of Appeals reversed PERB. The court reviewed the conflicting decisions of other jurisdictions and observed that
at the time HEEERA was enacted, there were two well-defined views
33. See Malin, Student Employees and Collective Bargaining, 69 Ky. L. J. 1, 27-28 (1980).
34. Board of Regents v. PERC, 368 So. 2d 641 (Fla. App.), review denied, 379 So. 2d 202 (Fla.
1979).
35. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.203(3) (West 1981 & Supp. 1984).
36. United Faculty of Florida and Board of Regents, 7 Fl. PuB. EMPL. REP. (LAB. REL.
PRESS)
12409 (1981).

37. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 3562(0 (West 1980 & Supp. 1985).
38.

7 CAL. PUB. EMPL. REP. (LAB. REL. PRESS)

App. 1984).

14066 (1983), rev'd, 205 Cal. Rptr. 49 (Cal.
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concerning the status of hospital housestaff. It further observed that the
legislature could have easily specified which view should prevail in California but chose instead to set forth general criteria and leave the application of those criteria to PERB and the courts. The court then rejected
PERB's reliance on the objective indicia that housestaff educational
objectives were subordinate to the services they provided and assessed
the purposes of internship and residency programs subjectively. The
court relied primarily on statements contained in the governing document for residency accredidation that declared the primary purpose of a
residency to be educational. The court concluded that housestaff did not
work primarily for monetary gain but instead were fulfilling educational
requirements.
It is remarkable that the IELRA follows neither the Florida model
of specifically identifying who is excluded as a student employee or the
California model of setting down general guidelines to apply in determining who is excluded. During the House consideration of the IELRA,
Representative Nelson apparently drafted an amendment that would
have excluded managerial, confidential, part-time and student employees
from the IELRA's coverage. 39 The amendment would have defined student as "any individual who is enrolled and attending classes by an educational employer and is employed on a temporary basis less than fulltime." The amendment was never formally offered.
It is clear that the Nelson amendment was not the model for the
Governor's amendatory veto. While the amendatory veto added exclusions of managerial, confidential and student employees, it did not generally exclude part-time employees, and its definitions of managers and
supervisors differ substantially from those contained in the Nelson
amendment.
It is equally remarkable that the exclusion of student employees was
not clarified during the floor debates on the amendatory veto. Both majority and minority staff analyses of the amendatory veto noted the problem of adding an undefined exclusion for student employees. 4°
It could be argued that the exclusion of student employees extends
to any employee who is also enrolled for classes with the employer. This
extreme position lacks any precedent and has been rejected by the
NLRB. 4 1 Many educational employers allow employees to take courses
tuition free or at a reduced tuition. To hold that employees taking ad39. See House Majority Amendment Analysis, Amendment 20, for H.B. 1530 (May 24, 1983).
40. House Majority, Veto Analysis for H.B. 1530 (1983); House Minority, Veto Analysis for

H.B. 1530 (1983).
41.

The NLRB included employees who were working full-time while taking classes part-time
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vantage of such benefits lose their employee status could severely disrupt
the administration of the Act. Such a result finds no support in the overall statutory scheme or legislative history.
A second possible interpretation of the student employee exclusion
is that it follows the NLRB's approach of relying on subjective motivation and excluding all employees who are "primarily students." The
only indication of the Illinois legislature's intent regarding this approach
is contained in the IPLRA, where the definition of "employee" expressly
includes hospital housestaff.42 This provision is contrary to the NLRB
decisions which exclude housestaff, and other student employees, based
upon their subjective motivation for working. Thus, in the IPLRA, the
Illinois legislature has expressly rejected the NLRB's approach to student employees.
The NLRB's approach is also inconsistent with the IELRA's general approach to exclusions from coverage. Under the IELRA, exclusion
of employees whose job duties involve some supervisory or managerial
functions is determined not by their subjective views of their employment, but by an objective percentage of employment time test. Exclusion
of part-time community college employees is determined not by their
subjective motives for working but by an objective standard; the number
of credit hours they teach each semester. The scope of the IELRA's
exclusion of student employees should be determined similarly, not by a
subjective analysis of whether the individuals are primarily students or
primarily employees, but by an objective analysis of the employment
relationship.
In many cases the employment relationship and the student relationship are objectively separable, such that it is not difficult to cover the
employment relationship in collective bargaining while excluding the student relationship from the Act's coverage. For example, this separability
is evident in cases which include hospital housestaff and many students
employed in nonacademic positions at their schools. In these cases, the
statutory exclusion of students excludes the student relationship but not
the employment relationship from the Act's coverage. In some instances,
however, employment is inseparably intertwined with student status.
For example, it is usually impossible to be a graduate assistant without
also being a student. The assistant's work may consist of research to be
used in his dissertation. The assistant's stipend is frequently tax exempt
in full-time nonstudent employee bargaining units in Macke Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 90, 91 n.4 (1974),

and in Cornell Univ., 202 N.L.R.B. 290, 292 n.10 (1973).
42. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
1603(m) (Supp. 1983).
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and the assistant's relationship to his "supervisor" is essentially studentteacher. 43 Similar inseparability of student and employee status occurs
with respect to student teachers. It may also occur where student employment is an inseparable part of a financial aid package.4 In these
cases, the statutory exclusion of students excludes both the student and
the employment relationship from the Act's coverage.
RECOGNITION OF EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVES

The IELRA sets forth two methods by which a union can be certified as exclusive bargaining representative: representation elections and
voluntary recognition. Pursuant to section 7(b) of the Act, an employer
may voluntarily recognize a union it believes to represent a majority of
the employees. Section 7(c) authorizes an employer to file a representation petition if the employer doubts the majority status of a union that
has requested recognition. The interplay of sections 7(b) and 7(c) are
susceptible to an interpretation that an employer faced with a recognition
request has only two statutory alternatives: initiate voluntary recognition proceedings if it agrees with the union's claim of majority status or
file an election petition if it doubts the claim. The IELRB regulations
reject this interpretation and allow an employer to decline to respond to a
45
recognition request.

In Linden Lumber Division, Sumner & Co. v. NLRB, 46 the Supreme
Court held that in the private sector an employer may ignore or refuse a
union request for recognition and need not file a representation petition.
The Court deferred to the NLRB's expert judgment that placing the burden of filing a representation petition on the union facilitated the administration of the NLRA. The IELRB's similar determination is entitled to
similar deference. To provide, as the statute does, that an employer may
initiate voluntary recognition proceedings and may file an election petition is not to require that an employer do one or the other.
Representation election petitions may be filed by employees, unions
and employers. 4 7 Employee and union petitions must be supported by a
thirty percent showing of interest in the bargaining unit. 48 The Act per43. See Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621 (1974); cf. Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B.
134, 135-36 (1971) (faculty are not supervisors even though they supervise graduate assistants because the relationship is teacher-student rather than supervisor-employee).
44. See, e.g., Cornell Univ., 202 N.L.R.B. 290 (1973); Brief for the Employer at 31, 33, id..
45. 80 Ill. Adm. Code § 1110.30.
46. 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
47. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1707(c)(1), (2) (Supp. 1983).
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1707(c)(1) (Supp. 1983).
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mits rival unions to intervene upon a fifteen percent showing of interest. 49
The IELRB rules generally take a liberal approach to the showing of
interest requirement. 50 The rules also contain relatively standard proce5
dures for investigating election petitions and conducting elections. '
The statute creates an election bar of one year and a contract bar of
up to three years to the holding of an election.5 2 The IELRB rules add a
one year voluntary recognition certification bar. 53 The statutory window

period for filing representation election petitions is set at January 15th
through March 1st of the final year of the contract bar. This window
period is designed to promote stability in education labor relations by
resolving representation issues prior to the time that negotiations for a
new contract would ordinarily begin. It is part of an overall statutory
model designed to promote resolution of education labor disputes at the
54
bargaining table, thereby minimizing the potential for strikes.
The IELRB rules interpret the statutory window period as part of a
directory model rather than a mandatory filing period. The rules implement the legislative direction that representation issues be resolved prior
to the normal bargaining time to maximize stability and minimize disruption. They divide bargaining units into those that contain and those
that do not contain professional instructional personnel. With respect to
49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1708 (Supp. 1983).
50. The rules do not restrict the showing of interest to authorization cards and petitions, but
include other evidence which demonstrates employee desire to be represented in collective bargaining by the employee organization. 80 Il. Adm. Code § 1110.80(a). The sufficiency of evidence other
than cards and petitions must be judged on a case by case basis. For example, membership applications are usually evidence of a desire for representation. Certain professional organizations such as
the American Association of University Professors, however, serve many functions in addition to
collective bargaining representative. Membership in these organizations does not necessarily evidence a desire for collective bargaining representation.
The rules provide that authorization cards are valid for six months from date of signature. 80
Ill. Adm. Code § 1110.80(d). Where an employee signs cards for more than one union, each card is
counted toward the showing of interest. 80 Ill. Adm. Code § 1110.80(e). The rules also take a
liberal approach to intervention, allowing it at anytime up to 15 days prior to the election. 80 Ill.
Adm. Code § 1 10.100(d).
51. See generally 80 Il. Adm. Code §§ 1110.100 to 1110.140. During the rulemaking proceeding, a controversy developed concerning the identity of employer election observers. The Board's
proposed rules prohibited managers, supervisors and confidential employees from serving as observers. 8 Ill. Admin. Reg. 7152, 7167 (1984). During the comment period, employers objected that the
proposed rule effectively left them without observers. The adopted rules simply provide that the
identity of the observers is subject to the control of the Board or its agent, 80 Ill. Adm. Code
§ 1110.140(c), thereby leaving the issue to a case by case determination,
52. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1707(c) (Supp. 1983). The election bar forbids the Board from
holding a representation election within one year following a valid Board election. For a description
of the contract bar see supra p. 103.
53. 80 Il1. Adm. Code §§ 1110.70(a)(1), (b)(2). The certification bar prohibits the filing of a
representation petition within one year following Board certification pursuant to voluntary
recognition.
54. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.

CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW

the former, the rules set the window period at January 15th through
March 1st, reflecting the Board's judgment based on existing patterns of
bargaining that employees in those units work only during the school
year and bargaining aims for agreement by the beginning of the coming
school year. 55 With respect to the latter, the rules set the window period
at forty-five to ninety days prior to the expiration of the existing collective bargaining agreement, reflecting the Board's judgment based on existing patterns of bargaining that employees in those units work year
round and bargaining aims for agreement by the time the existing agreement expires.

56

The Act also provides that the election "shall be held no later than
ninety days after the date the petition was filed." ' 57 An issue that arose
early in the Act's history was whether this provision mandates that the
Board hold the election within ninety days or merely directs the Board to
hold the election expeditiously. The word "shall" is ambiguous and
must be construed according to the circumstances in which it is used.58
Statutory prescriptions regarding the timing of particular actions are
usually held to be directory unless the statute expressly provides that the
action is void if not undertaken during the prescribed time or unless failure to act within the prescribed time would seriously injure the rights of
interested parties. 59 Courts also consider the practicalities of complying
with the prescribed time period in determining whether the period is
60
mandatory or directory.
The IELRA does not expressly provide that an election held on the
ninety-first day is void, nor is it likely that the legislature intended such a
result. Practical considerations may necessitate holding an election later
than ninety days after the petition is filed. Representation cases involving complex bargaining unit issues may take considerable time to resolve;
even in simple cases, when a petition is filed late in the school year, the
55.

80 Ill. Adm. Code § 110.70(a)(3).

56. Id.
57.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,

1707(c) (Supp. 1983).

58. See, e.g., Carrigan v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 19 II1.
2d 230, 166 N.E.2d 574 (1960); Carr
v. Board of Educ., 14 Ill. 2d 40, 150 N.E.2d 583 (1958); Hester v. Kamykowski, 13 I11.
2d 481, 150
N.E.2d 196 (1958); Walker v. Cronin, 107 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 438 N.E.2d 582 (1982); Jones v. Eagle
II, 99 I11.
App. 3d 64, 424 N.E.2d 1253 (1981).
59. Ordinarily a statute which specifies the time for the performance of an official duty will
be considered directory only where the rights of the parties cannot be injuriously affected
by failure to act within the time indicated. However, where such statute contains negative
words, denying the exercise of the power after the time named, or where a disregard of its
provisions would injuriously affect public interests or private rights, it is not directory but
mandatory.
Carrigan v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 19 Ill. 2d 230, 233, 166 N.E.2d 574, 576 (1960). Compare
Carrigan with Hester v. Kamykowski, 13 II1. 2d 481, 150 N.E.2d 196 (1958).
60. Cf Watts v. Board of Educ., 125 II1. App. 3d 532, 466 N.E.2d 311 (1984).
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election may have to be held later than ninety days after the filing of the
petition to avoid holding the election during the summer when, in units
containing professional instructional personnel, most employees will be
unavailable to vote. 6 1 Thus, under generally accepted principles of statutory construction, the ninety-day provision could only be considered
mandatory if a failure to hold an election within that period would seriously injure the rights of interested parties.
The rights that are most directly affected by the timing of the election are the employees' rights to select their representative for collective
bargaining. If the ninety-day provision is directory, the IELRB can postpone an election until after the composition of the bargaining unit and
similar issues are resolved. This furthers the employees' rights. The definition of the bargaining unit may determine which unions qualify for the
ballot. Even in cases where all unions that have petitioned or intervened
will clearly qualify for the ballot, an employee's decision on which union
to vote for or even whether to vote for any union may be influenced by
the composition of the bargaining unit. The employee's right to vote certainly includes the right to an informed vote.
If the ninety-day provision is mandatory and an election is held
before all pre-election issues are settled, many employees will be forced to
vote by challenged ballot to preserve the outstanding issues for post election resolution. 62 Many employees will be voting without knowing what
bargaining unit they would be in, whether their choice had qualified for
the ballot, or even whether their vote would ultimately be counted. Such
large scale uncertainty may render the right to vote meaningless in some
cases.
The timing of the election may also affect the employees' rights to
engage in collective bargaining. If an employer is required to cease negotiating a new agreement with the incumbent union when a rival union
files a representation petition, collective bargaining will not resume until
the election is held and the results are certified. Unfortunately, holding
the election before all pre-election issues have been resolved will not re61. During hearings on the IELRB's proposed representation rules, the Illinois Federation of
Teachers (IFT) argued that the 90-day period is mandatory. Even the IFT, however, conceded that
an exception would have to be created for teacher elections that would otherwise have to be held
during the summer. Chicago Representation Rules Hearings, supra note 10, at 120; IELRB, Proposed Rules and Regulations Dealing with Representation and Unfair Labor Practice Procedures,
Hearings on June 13, 1984, Springfield, pp. 83-84 (hereafter cited as Springfield Representation Rules
Hearings).
62. The IFT proposed handling unresolved pre-election issues in this manner. See Chicago
Representation Rules Hearings, supra note 10, at 118-120.
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sult in a faster certification. The issues will have to be resolved after the
election and certification will still be delayed.
An interpretation that the ninety-day period is mandatory, as discussed, would not serve to better protect the rights of the parties or the
employees. Moreover, such an interpretation may actually reduce the
incentive to stipulate to a consent election. A party who delays the bargaining unit resolution until after the election may be able to determine
how to construct the unit to guarantee victory. Parties, therefore, may
avoid resolving bargaining unit and similar issues by stipulation for consent election, preferring to litigate them after the election. The result
may be increased litigation and increased delay of certification.
Given the impractical and damaging effects of a mandatory ninetyday period for holding an election, the provision in the IELRA is clearly
directory. It is an intricate part of the statutory model for resolving representation issues prior to the normal time for bargaining. Indeed, the
clearly directory nature of the ninety-day election provision underscores
the basic directory nature of the entire statutory model for representation, collective bargaining and impasse resolution procedures.
The statutory alternative to certification through a representation
election is voluntary recognition. This procedure, set forth in section
7(b) of the Act, requires an employer to post, for twenty school days, a
notice of its intent to recognize a union. During the posting period, any
other union may file with the Board a petition supported by a fifteen
percent showing of interest in an appropriate unit containing all or some
of the employees in the unit that was to have been voluntarily recognized. The petition converts the voluntary recognition proceeding into
an election proceeding. If no petitions are filed, the employer, if satisfied
of the union's majority status, "shall send written notification of such
recognition to the Board for certification.

' '63

The IELRB's rules assert strict Board control over the voluntary
recognition procedures. The rules prohibit voluntary recognition whenever the bargaining unit is already represented by an exclusive represen64
tative and whenever a representation election petition can not be filed.
The rules require that an employer notify the Board of its intent to use
the voluntary recognition procedures 65 and specify the contents of the
63. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
1707(b) (Supp. 1983).
64. See 80 Ill.
Adm. Code § 11 10.40(a)(1), (2). The rules also forbid use of voluntary recognition in a bargaining unit mixing professional and nonprofessional employees. 80 11. Adm. Code
§ 11 10.40(a)(3). This provision implements the statutory requirement of a unit preference vote in
such a mixed unit. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
1707 (Supp. 1983).
65. 80 Ill.
Adm. Code § 1110.40(b).
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twenty-school day notice that must be posted. 66 The employer's request
for certification must be supported by objective evidence of the union's
majority status. 67 Board certification is not automatic but occurs only
after the Board's investigation confirms that the union represents a ma68
jority of the employees in an appropriate unit.
The IELRB rules obviously protect employees from potential employer-union collusion in the voluntary recognition process. Furthermore, the rules are designed to insure that a voluntary recognition
procedure is as reliable an indicator of employee free choice as a representation election. The reliability of the procedure enables the Board to
grant, in cases of voluntary recognition, a certification bar to the filing of
election petitions comparable to the bar resulting from a representation
election. The rules, thus, further stability in labor relations without sacrificing employee free choice.
The IELRA is silent concerning the fate of a voluntary recognition
that does not comply with the statutory procedure. The IELRB's rules
provide that such recognition or any contract negotiated pursuant to
69
such recognition cannot bar a petition for a representation election.
The rules are silent concerning whether such a recognition is also an
unfair labor practice. Resolution of this issue requires a determination of
whether the legislature intended, by providing an express statutory voluntary recognition procedure, to outlaw other voluntary recognitions.
As originally introduced, the bill that was to become the IELRA
expressly authorized employer voluntary recognition of unions with majority status. 70 This was replaced by the current section 7(b) procedure.
66. Id. at § 1110.40(c), (d).
67. Id. at § 1110.40(i). The rules do not specify what is acceptable objective evidence of majority status. They do specify that authorization cards which are not sufficient to establish a showing of
interest in support of an election petition and authorization cards from employees who have signed
cards for more than one union are not acceptable. Id. The rules do not expressly require that
authorization cards be submitted to the IELRB to substantiate the voluntary recognition. This is in
contrast with the voluntary recognition rules under IPLRA which invite the parties to submit the
cards jointly or the union to submit the cards in confidence to the Board. 80 I11. Adm. Code
§ 1210.160(i)(1). A traditional method of verifying majority status in private sector voluntary recognition is to have a neutral third party check the authorization cards against the employer's payroll
list. If the neutral follows the rules' provisions governing the cards' validity, the neutral's certification of majority status should be sufficient objective evidence to warrant certification.
68. 80 Ill. Adm. Code § 1110.40(0).
69. The rules state that Board-supervised elections and voluntary recognition are the exclusive
means by which "the bargaining relationship and any ensuing collective bargaining agreement are to
be pursuant to the 'Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act' and subject to the processes of this
Board." 80 Ill. Adm. Code § 1110.10. They further provide that a contract cannot serve as a bar if
it is negotiated with a union "recognized by the employer after the effective date of these rules
without having used the voluntary recognition or representation election procedures specified in the
Act and these regulations." Id. at § 1110.70(c).
70. H.B. 1530, as Introduced, § 5(b), provided:
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This legislative history strongly supports a conclusion that voluntary recognition outside the section 7(b) procedure is prohibited.
Prohibition of nonstatutory voluntary recognition is also implicit
within section 7(b). The statute expressly provides that voluntary recognition claims of majority status be tested by election upon a fifteen percent showing of interest by a rival union. A nonstatutory voluntary
recognition would circumvent this provision by forcing the rival union to
file a representation petition supported by a thirty percent showing of
interest to gain an election.
The Board's rules, by denying certification and contract bars to nonstatutory voluntary recognition, provide a substantial incentive to use the
statutory procedure, but do not prevent the circumvention. The rules
simply leave the recognition open to challenge at any time. The method
of challenge, however, remains the filing of a representation or decertification petition which must be supported by a thirty percent showing of
interest. The circumvention can only be prevented by holding that nonstatutory voluntary recognitions are illegal, thereby allowing them to be
challenged by the filing of unfair labor practice charges.
A comparison of section 7(b) to the private sector further reinforces
the conclusion that nonstatutory voluntary recognitions are illegal. The
NLRA contains no express provisions governing voluntary recognition.
Section 8(a)(2), however, prohibits employer domination, interference or
support of a labor organization. 7 1 An employer violates section 8(a)(2) if
it voluntarily recognizes a union that does not have majority status. 72
Considerable controversy exists over whether a private sector employer can lawfully voluntarily recognize a union that has majority status. If no other union is seeking to represent the same employees,
voluntary recognition clearly is permitted.
Since its decision in Midwest Piping Co., however, the NLRB has
attempted to reach a workable rule covering the circumstances under
which organizing by a rival union prevents an employer from recognizing
a majority union. 73 Section 7(b) answers this question by allowing the
Nothing in this or any other Act prohibits recognition of an employee organization as
the exclusive representative of an employer on mutual consent of the employer and the
employee organization, provided that the employee organization represents a majority of
the employees in an appropriate unit.
71. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982).
72. International Ladies Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
73. In Midwest Piping Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945), the NLRB held that an employer violated section 8(a)(2) when it voluntarily recognized a majority union where a rival had raised a "real
question concerning recognition." Over the years the Board increasingly broadened its view of what
constituted a "real question concerning recognition" to the point where any rival union's claim that
was more substantial than a "naked claim" precluded voluntary recognition of the majority union.
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rival union to block voluntary recognition with a fifteen percent showing
of interest. The rival union must petition the Board and the Board has
the burden of stopping the voluntary recognition. In this way an employer is protected from blundering in good faith into an unfair labor
practice because it was unaware of the extent of the rival union's support.
Voluntary recognition by methods other than the section 7(b) procedure
would circumvent this carefully crafted solution to the Midwest Piping
problem. Such action should be held to be an unfair labor practice.
In the private sector, the issues raised by Midwest Piping were not
limited to unorganized employers facing organization by two or more
rival unions. In Shea Chemical Corp.,74 the NLRB extended its Midwest
Piping doctrine and held that an organized employer could not continue
to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement with an incumbent
union after a rival had filed a representation petition. Twenty-four years
later, in RCA Del Caribe, Inc.,75 the NLRB reversed itself, holding that
an employer's duty to bargain with an incumbent continues despite the
filing of a rival's representation petition. The IELRB's proposed rules
followed Shea Chemical.76 The rules ultimately adopted by the IELRB
77
are silent, thus leaving the issue unresolved.
In RCA Del Caribe, the NLRB evaluated its experience under Shea
Chemical and concluded that its "efforts to promote employee free
choice have been at a price to the stability of collective-bargaining relationships."' 78 It viewed the concern with employer neutrality expressed

in Midwest Piping as less substantial where there is an incumbent representative. In the NLRB's view, recognition of one union over a rival
where neither is the incumbent changes the status quo and inherently
gives the recognized union an unfair advantage. Continued bargaining
with an incumbent, however, maintains the status quo. If the parties
reach agreement, the incumbent receives a legitimate advantage of incumbency. This approach, the NLRB concluded, "is the better way to
'79
approximate employer neutrality."
See American Can Co., 218 N.L.R.B. 102 (1975), enf'd, 535 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1976); Playschool,
Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 560 (1972), enf't denied, 477 F.2d 66 (7th Cir. 1973). However, in Bruckner
Nursing Home, 262 N.L.R.B. 955 (1982), the NLRB reversed itself, holding that an employer may
voluntarily recognize a majority union at any time prior to a rival's filing of a representation petition.
74. 121 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1958).
75. 262 N.L.R.B. 963 (1982).
76. 8 Il1. Admin. Reg. 7152, 7155 (1984).
77. One should not infer from the IELRB's deletion of the Shea Chemical provision that the
IELRB reversed its view. Deletion only reflects a decision that the issue contains too many complex
substantive questions to be resolved by rulemaking. See Springfield Representation Rule Hearings,
supra note 61, at 69-70 (remarks of Board Member Wildman).
78. 262 N.L.R.B. at 965.
79. Id.
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The NLRB's reasoning should not be adopted under the IELRA.
The NLRB gives considerable weight to stability in an inherently unstable situation, i.e., where an incumbent has been challenged to an election.
When no question concerning representation is pending, an employer negotiates knowing that an agreement will provide labor peace for its term.
However, under RCA Del Caribe, an employer cannot rely on the agreement where an election is pending. If the rival wins the election, any
agreement negotiated with the incumbent is null and void. 80 The
IELRA requires an employer to bargain with a newly certified union
upon demand within sixty days following certification. Thus, under the
IELRA, as in the private sector, any agreement reached with the incum81
bent is superceded by a duty to bargain with the victorious rival.
In deciding that continued bargaining with the incumbent is the better way to approximate employer neutrality, RCA Del Caribe only considers the effects on the election of an employer-incumbent agreement. It
ignores the possibility that an employer might intentionally avoid agreement to aid in the incumbent's defeat. Such action likely would violate
the employer's duty to bargain in good faith. However, failure to reach
agreement may just as likely result from the incumbent's weakness as
from the employer's bad faith. A weak incumbent, unable to reach
agreement and afraid that it will lose the election, is likely to block the
election 8 2 by filing unfair labor practice charges accusing the employer of
bad faith bargaining. An incumbent who does not file blocking charges
and loses the election will likely file objections and unfair labor practice
charges after the election.
On the other hand, an employer does not preserve the status quo if it
intentionally assists the incumbent's campaign by agreeing to a more
generous contract than it would have agreed to were there no pending
election. Such action would likely constitute illegal employer support for
the incumbent union. When agreements are reached rivals can be ex80. Id. at 966; American Seating Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 250 (1953).
81. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
1712 (Supp. 1983). The only other alternative would be to require any agreement reached by the incumbent and the employer to remain in effect but require the
employer to bargain with the rival within 60 days after certification. If the agreement remains in
effect, however, the rival will be unable to strike. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 48,
1713(d) (Supp. 1983).
Thus, the major incentive for the employer to reach agreement would not be present. Bargaining
would precede in the face of an artificial strike prohibition. This would be inconsistent with the
process of collective bargaining as envisioned by the legislature. See infra notes 95-113 and accompanying text.
82. Generally, in the private sector the pending unfair labor practice charges will delay the
holding of an election until the charges are resolved. Even in RCA Del Caribe,the NLRB conceded
that undue delays in the holding of an election "would make the difficult task of an incumbent
almost impossible, and would too often have the further effect of making the filing of a petition
during the 'open period' a nullity." 262 N.L.R.B. at 966.

IMPLEMENTING THE IELRA

pected to file blocking charges or objections to the election. This will
require the Board to intrude deeply into the bargaining process to determine whether the agreement represents legitimate bargaining by the parties or unlawful employer support of the incumbent.
This is not to suggest that it should be presumed that educational
employers will deliberately use the negotiations process to manipulate
the election outcome. Rather, it demonstrates that an employer attempting to comply with RCA Del Caribe faces a no-win situation. If the employer reaches agreement, it faces the likelihood of unfair labor practice
charges by the rival; if the employer fails to reach agreement, it faces the
likelihood of unfair labor practice charges by the incumbent. Given the
uncertainty created by a pending election, in reality, there is no status
quo for an employer to maintain.
Shea Chemical established an objective rule that employers could
easily follow. Requiring an employer to refrain from negotiations when a
representation petition is filed not only protects employee free choice, but
also protects employers from blundering into unintended unfair labor
practices. In section 7(b), the legislature designed an objective, easily
followed answer to the Midwest Piping issue for an unorganized employer. Shea Chemical provides a comparable answer to the Midwest
Piping issue for an organized employer where the incumbent union is
being challenged by a rival.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND IMPASSE RESOLUTION

Prior to enactment of the IELRA, public education employees in
Illinois had a constitutional right to join labor unions,8 3 but little other
legal protection. At common law, employers had the discretion to recognize unions and enter into collective bargaining agreements, 8 4 but were
not legally compelled to do S0.85 Employers could rescind previously
granted recognition, 8 6 and could discriminate between groups of employees, recognizing a union for one group while refusing to recognize a
union for another group.8 7 Issues concerning the scope of the bargaining
83. See McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968).
84. See, e.g., Chicago Principals Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 84 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 406 N.E.2d 82
(1980); Chicago Division, Illinois Education Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 76 Iln. App.2d 456, 222
N.E.2d 243 (1966).
85. See, e.g., Rend Lake College Federation of Teachers v. Board of Community College, 84 Ill.
App. 3d 308, 405 N.E.2d 364 (1980); Cook County Police Ass'n v. City of Harvey, 8 Ill. App. 3d
147, 269 N.E.2d 226 (1972).
86. See Naperville Police Union, Local 2233 v. City of Naperville, 97 Ill. App. 3d 153, 422
N.E.2d 869 (1981).
87. Id.

122
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unit were also left to employer discretion.8 8
A 1981 amendment to the School Code 89 gave public school employees a right to petition the regional superintendent to conduct representation elections, and charged the regional superintendent with the
duty to administer such elections and certify a union which received a
majority of the votes cast as the employees' exclusive bargaining representative. However, the statute did not expressly require employers to
bargain in good faith and contained no express enforcement procedures.
When collective bargaining did occur, the process was clouded by
considerable uncertainty due to overriding concerns of administrative
law and local government law. Illinois courts were frequently called
upon to determine whether agreements of the parties illegally delegated
discretion that had been statutorily vested in the employer. 90 Stable labor relations were undermined by court decisions holding multiyear collective bargaining agreements to be void because they conflicted with
statutory prohibitions on entering into contracts to expend money that
had not yet been appropriated. 9' Additionally, strikes by public employ88. See, e.g., Tobin v. Health and Hospitals Governing Comm'n, 66 Ill. App. 3d 564, 384
N.E.2d 77 (1978); Chicago High School Assistant Principals Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 5 Ill. App. 3d
672, 284 N.E.2d 14 (1972).
89. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122,
3-14.24 (Supp. 1981) (repealed by the IELRA).
90. Compare Lockport Area Special Education Cooperative v. Lockport Area Special Educ.
Cooperative Ass'n, 33 111.App. 3d 789, 338 N.E.2d 463 (1975) and Board of Education v. Rockford
Educ. Ass'n, 3 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 208 N.E.2d 286 (1972) with Chicago Principals Ass'n v. Board of
Educ., 84 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 406 N.E.2d 82 (1980) and Classroom Teachers Association v. Board of
Educ., 15 Il1. App. 3d 224, 304 N.E.2d 516 (1973).
91. See Chicago Patrolmen's Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 56 Ill. 2d 503, 309 N.E.2d 3 (1974);
Board of Education v. Chicago Teachers Union, 26 Il. App. 3d 806, 326 N.E.2d 158 (1975). In
Chicago Teachers Union, the court criticized the effect of the statute on labor relations, but considered itself bound to void the second year of a two year collective bargaining agreement.:
Admittedly, this affirmance states a rule that deprives the Board of the power to enter
into a legally enforceable multiyear contract with its teachers and those of its employees
represented by Union without first making an appropriation to pay for the liability incurred under such a contract. Collective-bargaining agreements between school boards
and school employees are not against public policy. In fact, evolution of contemporary
American law strongly suggests that such agreements are necessary for the sound adminstration of a modern public "chool system. And, unquestionably, multiyear contracts can
be the source of stability between a public employer and its employees. However, section
34-49 prohibits Board from entering into a contract with Union for more than 1 year, no
matter how beneficial such a contract may be to the Chicago school system.
This is not true of other things for which Board must contract in the discharge of its
responsibilities. For example, section 34-49 contains exceptions that permit Board to lease
real or personal property for any period not exceeding 40 years, contract for more than 1
year to construct buildings, purchase fuel, obtain service for removal of ashes and provide
for transportation of pupils. The anomaly of section 34-49 is that while it permits Board to
enter into multiyear contracts for mundane matters, it prohibits Board from contracting
for more than 1 year with the most important segment of the community with which it
deals: its teachers. Nonetheless, as we have said earlier, we cannot disregard a prohibition
mandated by the legislature. Therefore, Union's argument urging us to construe section
34-49 so as to validate the 2-year contract with the Board is one that will have to be
addressed to the legislature.
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ees were illegal and enjoinable, notwithstanding the provisions of the Illinois Anti-Injunction Act. 92 Employers were not required to reinstate
returning strikers and could discriminate among strikers with regard to
reinstatement.

93

Despite this pre-IELRA state of the law that reflected an attitude
ranging from indifference to hostility toward public employee collective
bargaining, unionization developed rather extensively in Illinois public
education. By the time the IELRA was passed, a substantial number of
94
the public school districts in the state engaged in collective bargaining.
Despite their illegality, strikes had become a reality in public education
in Illinois. 95 The IELRA recognizes this reality and is a legislative attempt to bring order to the previously chaotic state of labor relations in
public education.
The IELRA has been characterized as a strike driven statute. 96 Unlike public sector labor relations statutes in most other jurisdictions, 97 the
IELRA does not prohibit strikes. It recognizes that statutory strike
prohibitions, like the pre-existing common law prohibitions, would be
ineffective. It seeks to minimize strikes by mandating good faith bargain26 Ill. App. 3d at 812-13, 326 N.E.2d at 163 (citations omitted). Fortunately, the legislature
amended the School Code to permit the Chicago School Board to enter multiyear collective bargain34-49 (1983).
ing agreements of up to three years duration. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122,
92. City of Pana v. Crowe, 57 Ill. 2d 547, 316 N.E.2d 513 (1974); Board of Education v. Redding, 32 111. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965); but see County of Peoria v. Benedict, 47 111. 2d 166, 265
N.E.2d 141 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 929 (1971).
93. See, e.g., Battle v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 78 Ill. App. 3d 828, 396 N.E.2d 1321 (1979);
Strobeck v. Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 70 Ill. App. 3d 772, 388 N.E.2d 912 (1979).
94. 83rd Gen. Assem., House Committee on Elementary & Secondary Education, Hearings on
May 6, 1983.
95. Data obtained from the IELRB and the Illinois State Board of Education indicates the
following experience with teacher strikes in elementary and secondary education for the nine academic years prior to the IELRA:
YEAR

NUMBER OF STRIKES

26
1975-76
25
1976-77
16
1977-78
26
1978-79
40
1979-80
36
1980-81
21
1981-82
16
1982-83
15
1983-84
96. IELRB, Proposed Rules and Regulations Dealing with General Procedures and Impasse
Resolution, Hearings on July 12, 1984, Chicago, p. 23 (hereafter cited as Chicago Impasse Hearings)
(remarks of IELRB Member Wildman).
97. For an excellent general overview of the treatment of strikes in the public sector, see Hanslowe & Acierno, The Law and Theory of Strikes by Government Employees, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
1055 (1982); see also, Annot., 22 A.L.R. 4th 1103 (1983); Annot., 37 A.L.R. 3d 1147 (1971).
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ing and mediation before resort to economic warfare. 98 It also sanctions,

but does not require the use of, interest arbitration as an alternative to
strikes. This section of the article discusses the statutory provisions, the
IELRB rules implementing the statute and several major issues not expressly addressed in the statute or the rules.
The IELRA provides for all unions and employers to file a notice
with the IELRB, giving the status of their negotiations, ninety days prior
to the scheduled start of the upcoming school year. At any time, beginning forty-five days prior to start of the school year, either party may
petition the IELRB to invoke mediation. During this period, the IELRB
may invoke mediation if it finds that the parties are at impasse. Fifteen
days prior to the start of the school year, the IELRB is required to invoke mediation. 99
98. Representative Stuffle, a sponsor of the IELRA firmly stated this before the House
Committee:
Page 17, importantly, limits when a strike can occur in major fashion. I think that's
most important because we all know now, whether we like it or not, strikes are already
occurring in willy nilly fashion throughout the state. We end up in court. We do battle in
1009 school districts in different fashions and in different courts. This makes uniform the
provision when strikes can occur and attempts to limit them as much as possible...
83rd Gen. Assem., House Committee on Elementary & Secondary Education, Hearings May 6,
1983.
99. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1712 (Sup. 1983). The term "impasse" does not appear to be
used in this context as it is used in the private sector. Under the NLRA, impasse is that point at
which the parties, despite the best of faith, are simply deadlocked. It is determined by evaluating the
parties' bargaining history, their good faith, the length of negotiations, the importance of the issues,
and the understandings of the parties. Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967). The
ultimate determination is a judgment that, because further negotiations under the existing conditions
would be futile, the parties are freed from the constraints of the bargaining process and may act
unilaterally with regard to mandatory subject of bargaining. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736
(1962); Stewart and Engeman, Impasse, Collective Bargaining and Action, 39 CIN. L. REV. 233
(1970); Comment, Impasse in Collective Bargaining, 44 TEX. L. REV. 769 (1966).
Under the IELRA, impasse is one of two requirements for a unilateral petition to invoke mediation during the 45-day period. The other is that the parties have engaged in "a reasonable period of
negotiation." There is no suggestion that appointment of a mediator indicates the futility of further
negotiations and the freedom of the parties to act unilaterally. Indeed, the principal union response
to unilateral employer action, a strike, is not permitted until mediation has been used without success. Mediation is a vital stage of the IELRA negotiation process.
A competent mediator can educate unsophisticated negotiators concerning the operation of the bargaining process and reopen severed channels of communication. While recalcitrant parties at or on the verge of an impasse are usually still talking to one another,
neither side may be truly listening to what the other side is endeavoring to say. An adroit
mediator can re-establish meaningful communications and induce the parties to focus their
attention upon their areas of common interest. Emotional issues can be diffused, and direct
conflicts can be minimized. This permits the mediator to act as a face-saving catalyst
which can often enable parties to achieve a mutually acceptable accord.
Craver, Public Sector Impasse Resolution Procedures, 60 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 779, 780 (1984) (footnote
omitted).
The IELRB rules recognize the distinction between use of the term "impasse" in the private
sector and in the IELRA. The rules provide that unilateral requests for mediation will be granted if
bargaining has not resulted in an agreement and the Board concludes that mediation would assist the
parties. In determining whether mediation would assist the parties, the Board considers the number
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Strikes are lawful if they meet five conditions: the employees must
be represented by an exclusive bargaining representative; the existing collective bargaining agreement must have expired; mediation must have
been used without success; at least five days notice of intent to strike
must have been given to the employer, the regional superintendent and
the IELRB; and the parties must not have agreed to resolve their dispute
through interest arbitration. If a strike poses a clear and present danger
to the public health and safety, an employer may obtain an injunction in
circuit court. However, an employer's lack of clean hands, including
unfair labor practices, is a defense in injunction actions. °°
The IELRB rules place a significant gloss on the statute in two respects. In so doing, the rules address two problems apparently not considered by the legislature. The first problem was raised during hearings
on the IELRB's proposed rules. The statute appears to mandate that the
IELRB invoke mediation fifteen days before the start of the school year
whenever the parties have not yet reached agreement. However, in many
cases, mandating formal mediation at this juncture may be counterproductive. The parties may be making adequate progress on their own,
and the bargaining may not yet be ripe for mediation.10 1
The IELRA views mandated mediation as a major tool for facilitating agreements and thereby preventing strikes. The requirement that the
IELRB invoke mediation during this fifteen-day period places on the
Board a duty to insure that mediation be used prior to a strike. This duty
is independent of the parties' obligations under the Act.10 2 Forcing a
of bargaining sessions, the number and significance of issues in dispute, the experience of the negotiators and the bargaining history of the parties. 80 Ill. Adm. Code § 1130.30(e). These factors effectively define the term "impasse" as used in section 12 of the IELRA.
100. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1713 (Supp. 1983).
101. Concerns to this effect were voiced by representatives of both labor and management. See
Chicago Impasse Hearings, supra note 96, at 19-20, 53, 87-92, 115-16, 127.
The mediation process in the public sector can be a meaningful tool in resolving disputes if it is
recognized that the major incentive for agreement is the avoidance of strikes, be they legal or illegal.
Mediation must be properly timed to maximize its effectiveness. If mediation is ordered mechanically it can degenerate into little more than a procedural hurdle for the parties to clear before resorting to economic weapons. See Zack, Improving Mediation and Fact Finding in the Public Sector, 21
LAB. L.J. 259 (1978).
102. The Board's independent duty to ensure that mediation be used prior to a strike is clear in
light of the legislative history. During the House debates on the IELRA, the following colloquy
ensued between Representatives Vinson and McPike:
Vinson: Well, if the Board is not requested by the parties, may the Board, on its own
motion, initiate mediation, fact-finding, etcetera?
McPike: Yes. Yes.
Vinson: So, it is not necessary for either or both of the parties to request the Board to
involve itself?
McPike: Correct.
Vinson: What's the philosophy behind that? I mean, if both the union and the School
Board don't want the state agency involved, why should the state agency be involved?
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mediator on the parties at an inopportune time, however, would not further the statutory purpose of using mediation to facilitate agreement and,
in many cases, might inhibit it. The rules solve this problem by allowing
the parties to an invoked mediation to stipulate deferral of mediator selection indefinitely. The stipulation must also provide that the parties
shall not resort to economic weapons for at least ten days after a mediator is in place. The stipulation may be withdrawn by either party at any
time. 0 3 Thus, under the rules the IELRB asserts control over the use of
economic weapons to ensure that mediation will be used prior to a strike
in a good faith effort to resolve the dispute, while affording the parties the
flexibility to time the use of the mediator to maximize the likelihood of
successful mediation.
The second problem addressed by the rules, yet not considered by
the legislature, arises because the IELRA calculates the timing of notices
and mediation from the scheduled start of the forthcoming school year.
As has already been seen, the IELRA is modelled on teacher bargaining.
Its specified time periods for representation proceedings and collective
bargaining simply do not apply in any meaningful fashion to a large
number of situations. They must be viewed as a directory model for the
Board rather than a mandatory limitation on Board action.I°4
Although the express statutory time periods for bargaining notices
and mediation envision negotiations occurring prior to the scheduled
start of the upcoming school year, the statute also expressly envisions
negotiations occurring at other times. When a new exclusive representative is certified, the parties are required to begin negotiations upon demand within sixty days following certification. 105 Once negotiations
begin, they must continue for at least sixty days. This can occur at anytime, depending on the date of the representation election or voluntary
recognition proceedings, whether election objections are filed and the
complexity of the issues raised by the objections. According to the plain
terms of the statute, absent IELRB gloss, if bargaining begins in the late
fall or early winter, the parties would be unable to request the Board to
invoke mediation until forty-five days prior to the start of the following
school year, a considerable period of time after the mandatory sixty-day
bargaining period's expiration. Mediation would only be available if the
McPike: Well, we would hope that one of the purposes of this Bill is to provide for labor
peace. And if the Board feels that mediation and fact-finding may be helpful, and it will
lead to labor peace in a certain area, I think we all should be for that.
83rd Gen. Assem., House Debate on H.B. 1530, p. 36 (May 18, 1983).
103. 80 Ill. Adm. Code § 1130.30(b)(2).
104. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1712 (Supp. 1983).
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parties mutually agreed to mediation under the auspices of an agency
other than the IELRB. Either party could avoid mediation by withholding consent. Since mediation must be used without success before a legal
strike can occur, an inability to invoke mediation until forty-five days
before the start of the following school year would effectively prohibit
strikes until the following school year. The timing of the mediation
would produce an artificial strike prohibition.
Using mediation to produce an artificial strike prohibition is inconsistent with the function of mediation. It is also contrary to the overall
intent of the Illinois legislature. The legislature recognized that artificial
strike prohibitions are not effective in preventing strikes. It opted for
mediation as part of "a true and systematic method of resolving impasses" and thereby preventing strikes.106 It underscored the importance
of mediation by mandating that, notwithstanding the statutory time periods for invoking mediation, "the services of mediators shall continuously
be made available to the employer and to the exclusive bargaining representative for purposes of
0 7
disputes."

.

.

. mediation and arbitration of contract

The IELRB supplied the gloss needed to implement the statutory
scheme by providing special rules governing bargaining in units represented by newly certified exclusive representatives.10 8 The rules reiterate
106. This rationale was summarized by Representative Stuffie in closing the House Debates on
the third reading of H.B. 1530:
We live in the 20th Century, and we need to face 20th Century realities. The Bill is
not capitulating to labor, but it's an effort to provide a true and systematic method of
resolving impasses, of limiting strikes not promoting them, of eliminating decades of strife
in this state. No one wants strikes, no one at all. But they already occur, and we've got to
attempt to deal with the situation where there's no real order in the state in community
colleges, or colleges [or] for a (sic) 1,009 districts. In my district alone, we would have
prevented directly a strike last year with this Bill. There's no doubt about that. We would
have shortened others. It's time we settle our differences across the bargaining table. It's
time we settle them there, not in the streets, that we realize educational personnel ought to
be and are people, are taxpayers and ought to be first-class citizens. It forces no concessions on either party, but it recognizes the need to prevent arbitrary unwillingness to negotiate and compromise by either boards or teachers. ...
83rd Gen. Assem., House Debate on H.B. 1530, p. 255 (May 26, 1983). Similar intent was expressed
by Representative McPike during the House debates on the Governor's amendatory veto:
The real world that we live in has a strike currently going on in the City of Chicago
that has been going on for probably two weeks, but someone has now suggested mediation.
Had this Bill been law, there would have been mediation two months ago. There would
have been fact-finding two months ago. The parties would have been brought together two
months ago. The strike, in all probability, would not . . . would never have happened.
Our Bill, 1530, that sets forth these step-by-step procedures will, in the future, lead to far
fewer strikes, far less labor unrest than what we have today. . ..
83rd Gen. Assem., House Debates on H.B. 1530, p. 104 (Oct. 19, 1983).
107. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1712 (Supp. 1983).
108. 80 III. Adm. Code § 1130.20(a). Pursuant to Section 7.07 of the Illinois Administrative
Procedure Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, 1007.7 (1983). The Joint Committee on Administrative
Rules objected to these rules and to rules governing collective bargaining with existing exclusive
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the statutory requirement that once commenced, bargaining must continue for at least sixty days unless agreement is reached. Forty-five days
into this period, i.e., fifteen days before its expiration, mediation is automatically invoked.
Underlying this approach is a view that the mandatory sixty-day
bargaining period provides a time for negotiation that is insulated from
the parties' use of self-help. The provision impliedly prohibits the union
from striking for sixty days after negotiations have begun. 0 9 This interpretation of the required sixty-day bargaining period finds support in the
IPLRA. Section 7 of the IPLRA" t0 requires a party seeking to terminate
or modify an existing collective bargaining agreement to give the other
party sixty days notice of its intent and to continue to operate under the
terms of the existing agreement for sixty days without resort to strike or
lockout. This provision is adopted from section 8(d)(4) of the NLRA.III
Its purpose is to provide a cooling off period for negotiations to take
place free from the economic pressure of a strike or lockout in relation to
representatives in units not containing professional instructional personnel. See infra note 115 and
accompanying text; 8 Il. Admin. Reg. 21702-21708 (1984). The Joint Committee's objection interpreted the statutory model to be mandatory and prohibitive. In its view, the statute prohibited the
Board from invoking mediation at any time other than within 45 days of the scheduled start of the
school year. To support this position, the Joint Committee attributed some very strained purposes to
the legislature. It suggested that the legislature intended to prevent mediation and strikes in newly
certified units until the beginning of the following school year. The Joint Committee also suggested
that the legislature, by prohibiting the Board from invoking mediation at any time other than within
45 days of the scheduled start of the school year even though collective bargaining involving nonteaching personnel frequently occurs without reference to the school year intended to encourage all
collective bargaining agreements to run on a school year basis.
The Joint Committee buttressed its claim that the Board's rules were prohibited by the statute
by focusing on the Act's provision that mediators "continuously be made available.., for purposes
of arbitration of grievance and mediation or arbitration of contract disputes", ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
48, 1712 (Supp. 1983), arguing, "Clearly the legislature knew how to mandate that mediation be
made available throughout the forthcoming school year, and it did so only for contract disputes
resolution, not for negotiation."
The IELRB responded that the Joint Committee's objection required interpreting the Act to
create artificial strike prohibitions and to interfere with existing patterns of collective bargaining, two
results clearly contrary to the legislature's intent. The IELRB's response further observes that the
objection does not address implementation of the Act's mediation provisions for employers who have
no school year, and misuses the term "contract disputes." The Act clearly uses the term "contract
dispute" in opposition to "grievance." A grievance is generally understood to mean a dispute over
contract interpretation. "Contract dispute" as used in the IELRA clearly refers to disputes in contract negotiation. IELRB, Notice of Refusal to Meet Objection of the Joint Committee on Administrative Rules, 8 Ill. Admin. Reg. 22617 (1984). The Joint Committee's objection and the IELRB's
response thus reveals that the statutory time lines must be interpreted as a directory model because a
contrary interpretation leads to results totally unwarranted within the overall statutory scheme.
109. The only alternative interpretations make no sense. The provision certainly does not require the parties to physically meet and confer every day for 60 days. It also would not make sense
to require the parties to continue meeting if further negotiation would be futile.
110. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1607 (Supp. 1983).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(4) (1982).
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the subjects of negotiation.1 2 The IELRA's mandatory sixty-day bargaining period provides a similar cooling off period. This cooling off period applies to all negotiations but is particularly appropriate in
negotiations involving newly certified unions because certification will
frequently be preceded by a hard fought representation election.
The IELRB's rule thus views the expiration of the sixty-day bargaining period as the first date on which the union can be expected to
strike. In the statutory model, the scheduled start of the forthcoming
school year is the first date on which the union can be expected to strike.
The IELRB rule parallels the statutory model by invoking mediation fifteen days before the first potential strike date. If by that point the negotiations have not sufficiently progressed that mediation will be useful, the
parties may stipulate to defer selection of the mediator. If they so stipulate, they automatically extend the cooling off period by postponing any
strike until at least ten days after the mediator has been selected. Thus,
under the rule, the Board again asserts control over the use of economic
weapons to ensure that meaningful mediation will be used in an effort to
resolve bargaining disputes short of economic warfare. In this way, the
rule adapts the statutory model to bargaining in units represented by
newly certified representatives to fulfill the statutory purpose of preventing strikes through a systematic approach to bargaining.
In addition to bargaining with newly certified representatives, negotiations are likely to occur at times other than the forty-five day period
prior to the start of the school year in units composed of nonteaching
personnel. These units include employers, such as the State Board of
Education, who have no school year and employers whose operations
continue year round. Their collective bargaining agreements and their
collective bargaining practices often are not timed to the academic
calendar.
When contracts expire in the middle of the academic year, meaningful negotiations will not begin until shortly before their expiration dates,
considerably after the start of the academic year. Absent appropriate
agency gloss on the statute, neither party would be able to compel mediation until forty-five days before the start of the next academic year. Since
successful use of mediation is a requirement for a legal strike, a union
would be unable to strike until the start of the new academic year, long
after its existing contract had expired. A union seeking to preserve its
right to strike upon the expiration of its existing contract might serve a
bargaining demand during the summer before the academic year in
112. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 286 (1956).
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which the contract expires. This would enable the union to force mediation during the statutory mediation periods. Such forced mediation
would be premature and not likely to facilitate settlement. Its only accomplishment would be to provide the union with claims when the contract expires, that mediation was used without success and that the union
is free to strike. Such artificial intrusions into the bargaining process are
inconsistent with the statutory model of a systematic procedure to prevent strikes.
Alternatively, the parties might alter their bargaining to have their
contracts expire with the academic year. Such forced alterations, however, would conflict with express legislative declarations against disrup113
tion of traditional patterns of bargaining.
The legislature clearly envisioned bargaining by existing representatives that would not be tied to the school year. The IELRA does not
time their duty to bargain to the academic calendar. Instead, it mandates
bargaining within sixty days of receipt of a request by the other party to
bargain. 14 However, the statute provides no express procedures for mediation when the bargaining occurs at times other than immediately prior
to the start of the school year. The IELRB rules adapt the express statutory model to units that have no academic year and units for whom the
academic year is not related to bargaining. The rules provide that in
units that do not contain professional instructional personnel," 5 either
party may request mediation beginning forty-five days prior to the scheduled expiration date of the existing collective bargaining agreement. Mediation is automatically invoked fifteen days before the scheduled
expiration date, with the parties being able to stipulate deferral of the
selection of the mediator.
113. For example, Section 4 of the Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1704 (Supp. 1983), establishes
certain management rights, but further provides:
To preserve the rights of employers and exclusive representatives which have established collective bargaining relationships or negotiated collective bargaining agreements
prior to the effective date of this Act, employers shall be required to bargain collectively
with regard to any matter concerning wages, hours or conditions of employment about
which they have bargained for and agreed to in a collective bargaining agreement prior to
the effective date of this Act.
A similar intent not to interfere with existing patterns of bargaining is found in Section 7(a),
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
1707(a) (Supp. 1983):
Nothing in this Act shall interfere with or negate the current representation rights or
patterns or practices of employee organizations which have historically represented employees for the purpose of collective bargaining, including but not limited to the negotiation of wages, hours and working conditions, resolutions of employees' grievances, or
resolution of jurisdictional disputes, or the establishment and maintenance of prevailing
wage rates, unless a majority of the employees so represented express a contrary desire
under the procedures set forth in this Act.
114. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1712 (Supp. 1983).
115. 80 IIl. Adm. Code § 1130.20(c).
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The IELRB rules, thus, intricately expand the statutory mediation
procedures to bargaining relationships not expressly addressed by the
legislature. They premise this expansion on a view that the right to strike
plays a major role in the settlement of contract disputes. The rules, however, provide very few details of the role of the strike in the bargaining
process and of IELRB control of the strike weapon.
The statute also provides very little express guidance on controlling
strikes. The only express statutory control of the strike weapon involves
strikes which pose a clear and present danger to the public health or
safety. 1" 6 In such cases the employer may petition the circuit court to
enjoin the strike and the court may grant appropriate relief. Employer
unfair labor practices and other evidence of employer lack of clean hands
is a defense in the injunction action.
Although the clear and present danger standard is identical to the
IPLRA's standard for enjoining strikes, the IPLRA contains two strike
provisions not found in the IELRA. 117 First, the IPLRA requires an
employer to petition the Illinois State or Local Labor Relations Board to
investigate a strike, and permits the employer to seek a strike injunction
in circuit court only after the appropriate Board has found that a clear
and present danger exists. Second, the IPLRA provides that when a
strike is enjoined, the dispute must be submitted to interest arbitration
for resolution. The IPLRA thus forces an employer to choose between
taking the strike and submitting the dispute to arbitration." 8 The absence of these provisions from the IELRA is not explained in the legislative history.
The clear and present danger to the public health or safety is a carefully worded and deliberately narrow standard. During the debates on
the IPLRA, an amendment was offered that would have expanded the
standard for strike injunctions to include clear and present dangers to the
public welfare. Representative Davis, the amendment's sponsor, urged
its adoption on the ground that an expanded injunction was needed to
reach, among others, strikes that are unduly disruptive of public education. 1 9 Representative Grieman urged rejection of the amendment on
the ground that it would unduly burden a deliberately narrow standard
for injunctions. 20 With the philisophical debate clearly joined, the
116.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,

1713 (Supp. 1983).

117. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,

1618 (Supp. 1983).

118. See Craver, Public Sector Impasse Resolution Procedures, 60 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 779 (1984).
119.

83rd Gen. Assem., House Debate on S.B. 536, pp. 248-50 (June 24, 1983).

120. Id. at 249.
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amendment was rejected. 121 Thus, it is clear that the forced closure of
schools does not pose the type of danger to public health and safety that
warrants a strike injunction.
Two examples of strikes that might involve clear and present dangers to the public health or safety were given during the legislative debates: strikes involving municipal sanitation services and strikes in public
hospitals. 12 2 Educational employers do not provide municipal sanitation
services, but some operate public hospitals. However, even in the case of
state university hospitals, strikes are not automatically presumed to pose
clear and present dangers to the public health or safety. The limited
amount of case law available from other jurisdictions with similar standards for strike injunctions requires that the danger be literally clear and
present. The possibility of a dangerous situation arising in the future
does not provide adequate support for a strike injunction.' 23 The legislative debates on the IPLRA support this interpretation. For example, the
availability of alternative sources of the service usually provided by the
striking employees must be considered before concluding that a strike
poses a clear and present danger.124 Thus, even where a strike disrupts
121. Id. at 250. Similarly, during the Senate debates on the Governor's amendatory veto of the
IELRA, Senator Bruce reemphasized the narrowness of the clear and present danger to public
health and safety standard. He observed that Pennsylvania legalized public employee strikes but
allowed injunctions upon a showing of a clear and present danger to public health, safety or welfare
and continued:
In Pennsylvania, they put in health, safety and welfare; and I believe within our Illinois Statute, we have acted very wisely in our definition by deleting any reference to welfare and staying only with health and safety . . . Judges too often independently decide
what is welfare, and we have decided that problem for them by deleting that question.
In Bristol Township Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Bristol Township, 1 Pub. Barg. Cas. (CCH)
10,161 (Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 1974), the court enjoined a teacher strike on the ground that
because 26 student days had been lost due to the strike and only 23 possible make-up days remained
before the close of the fiscal year, the school district would lose state funds if the strike continued.
This threatened loss of state subsidies constituted a clear and present danger to the public welfare.
The legislature's rejection of the danger to the public welfare standard in the IELRA and IPLRA
suggests that cases such as Bristol Township should not be followed in Illinois.
122. 83rd Gen. Assem., House Debate on S.B. 536, pp. 193-94 (Nov. 2, 1983).
123. See Bellefonte Area Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 9 Pa. Commw. 210, 304 A.2d 922
(1973); Armstrong Educ. Ass'n v. Armstrong School Dist., 5 Pa. Commw. 378, 291 A.2d 120
(1972); Hazelton Area School Dist. v. Education Ass'n, 2 Pub. Barg. Cas. (CCH) 20,098 (Pa. Ct.
of Common Pleas, 1971).
124. In discussing sanitation services, Representative Greiman explained:
In the City of Highland Park, garbage is collected by private scavengers. So they're
not even public employees. In my town of Skokie, we have 60,000 people. We have a
Department of Public Works. If they went on strike, chances are we could probably-I
say probably-substitute that with private scavengers, because we're a small community.
Clearly, Lincolnwood, that I represent, could do that. The City of Chicago might not be
able to do that, so that some kind of garbage program for 3,000,000 people would be
required. In that way, the court. . . the Board could make the distinction as to - these
people are essential employees in one situation, these people are not.
83rd Gen. Assem., House Debate on S.B. 536, p. 194 (Nov. 2, 1983).
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operations at a state university hospital, a court should consider the ability of supervisors and managers at the struck hospital and of other public
hospitals serving the same community to fill the needs created by the
strike.
Although the presence of a clear and present danger presents a factual issue to be resolved by the court in each case, it is likely that the
issuance of strike injunctions under the IELRA will be rare. This may
explain the differences between the IELRA and IPLRA strike injunction
provisions. The legislature may have determined that, given the expected
rarity of strike injunctions, it was not necessary to have the IELRB
screen injunction petitions or to mandate interest arbitration.
Both the IELRA and the IPLRA provide that an employer's unclean hands, including employer unfair labor practices, may be defenses
to strike injunctions. The statutory language must be read carefully.
The statute refers to "unfair practices and other evidence of unclean
hands." Thus, the statute does not envision that every employer unfair
labor practice will be a defense to an injunction. Only those unfair practices, primarily failures to bargain in good faith, directly related to the
strike will be defenses. 125 The unfair practices, moreover, are significant
in the injunction proceeding only as evidence of unclean hands. The
issue for the court to decide is not whether the employer violated the
IELRA, but is whether the employer, seeking equitable relief against the
strike, has acted equitably in matters leading up to the strike. Prior
IELRB adjudication on the unfair labor practice issue is neither required
nor determinative of the unclean hands defense.
The IELRA does not expressly address the consequences of a strike
that does not comply with the statute. There are three possible consequences of an illegal strike. The strike is not protected and thus the employees are subject to discipline or discharge; the strike is an unfair labor
125. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1713 (Supp. 1983). This issue was raised during the House
debates on the IPLRA. The need for a link between the unfair labor practice and the strike was
stated clearly in a colloquy between Representatives Klemn and Greiman:
Klemn:
You say an unfair labor practice committed by the employer shall be a defense to such a
petition. Would that have to be, on a defense, would that have to be subjected to the
unfair labor practice. . . on page twenty-one, where they have to file a notice, you know,
ask . . . requesting the board ...

Greiman:

I think it would be an unfair labor practice that relates . . . that relates to the strike in
the collective bargaining process. If the contract provides that they have, you know, two
stools and a toilet, and one breaks down, that doesn't mean that they. . . that all of the
sanitation workers in Chicago can strike. It has to relate to the good faith of the employer in bargaining.
83rd Gen. Assem., House Debate on S.B. 536 (June 23, 1983). A similar result has been reached in
Michigan by applying traditional equitable principles of clean hands. See Holland School District v.
Holland Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968).
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practice; and the strike is enjoinable in circuit court upon petition of the
employer. Although this issue arose during the legislative debates, the
legislative history provides conflicting interpretations and relatively little
guidance. 126
It is virtually axiomatic that an illegal strike is unprotected and renders the employees subject to discipline and discharge.1 27 In the private
sector, most unprotected job actions are not unfair labor practices. In
NLRB v. InsuranceAgents InternationalUnion,' 28 the union engaged in
various job actions designed to harass the employer while contract negotiations were pending. The Court held that such conduct did not violate
the union's duty to bargain in good faith, imposed by section 8(b)(3) of
the NLRA.129 The Court reviewed the legislative history of the NLRA
and concluded that Congress viewed the application of economic pressure as a major part of the collective bargaining process. It concluded
that such pressure, even when not protected, did not amount to bad faith
bargaining. InsuranceAgents and its progency are thus premised on the
collective bargaining process envisioned by Congress. They cannot be
automatically followed under the IELRA without first inquiring into the
legislative vision of collective bargaining in Illinois public education.
The principal express statutory control on strikes in the private sector is the NLRA's requirement that a party seeking to terminate or modify an existing collective bargaining agreement serve a sixty-day notice on
the other party, serve a thirty-day notice of the existence of a dispute on
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, and refrain from strike
or lockout during the sixty-day notice period.130 Strikes during the no126. The legislative history is a sea of confusion concerning how to deal with illegal strikes.
Representative Greiman suggested that such strikes are enjoinable. 83rd Gen. Assem., House Debate on S.B. 536, p. 303 (June 23, 1983), while Senator Geo-Karis argued that such strikes are not
enjoinable. 83rd Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on S.B. 536, p. 305 (May 27, 1983). Senator Bruce
incorrectly stated that "the Act very clearly sets forth the authority of any aggrieved party to go
request. . . in the circuit court of the county. . . an injunction" against an illegal strike. 83rd Gen.
Assem., Senate Debate on H.B. 1530, p. 22 (June 27, 1983). Senator Collins stated on two occasions
that illegal strikes are enjoinable. 83rd Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on S.B. 536, pp. 302, 315 (May
27, 1983), but on two other occasions indicated that relief from illegal strikes should come through
unfair labor practice proceedings. Id. at 316; 83rd Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on S.B. 536, p. 111
(June 30, 1983).
Except for Senator Bruce's inaccurate description of the IELRA, none of the statements during
the floor debates suggest who is empowered to seek an injunction against an illegal strike. If an
illegal strike is an unfair labor practice, preliminary injunctive relief is available upon petition by the
Board. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
161 1(h), 1716(d) (Supp. 1983). The apparently conflicting statements of Representative Greiman and Senator Collins can be reconciled if illegal strikes are unfair
labor practices and injunctive relief is available through the unfair labor practice procedures.
127. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464 (1953).

128. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
129. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1982).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(4) (1982).
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tice period are breaches of the duty to bargain in good faith. '31 However,
unlike the strike provisions of the IELRA, the notice provision of the
NLRA is incorporated into the statutory definition of good faith bargaining. Thus, private sector precedent in this area is of limited utility in
determining whether illegal strikes are unfair labor practices under the
IELRA.
Federal court strike injunctions in the private sector are usually
barred by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 32 State court strike injunctions
are usually barred by comparable state statutes or by preemption of state
law by the NLRA. 133 The Illinois Anti-Injunction Act, 134 and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction 135 may provide comparable authority regarding the enjoining of strikes that do not comply with the IELRA.
The Anti-Injunction Act effectively prohibits an Illinois court from
enjoining a strike that is peaceable and is not accompanied by threats or
intimidation. In Fenske Bros., Inc. v. UpholsterersInternational Union,
Local 18,136 the Illinois Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs' arguments that
the act was unconstitutional because it deprived them of a remedy for
their injuries. The court interpreted the act as legalizing peaceful picketing. Consequently, the court reasoned, the plaintiffs did not suffer a legal
injury and could not complain that the act deprived them of a remedy.
In Board of Education v. Redding,13 7 the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the trial court's refusal to enjoin a strike by maintenance employees of a public school district. The court did not expressly address the
applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act to public sector strikes. Rather,
it declared a policy against public employee strikes, grounded on the
view that government functions may not be impeded, and on the absence
of the profit motive in the public sector. The court relied on a state constitutional provision mandating that the General Assembly "provide a
131.
132.
133.
Morris
134.

See, e.g., Local 219, Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 814 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982).
For a discussion of preemption, see The Developing Labor Law 1521-1524, 1530-1536 (C.
ed. 1983).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,

2a (Supp. 1983).

135. Primary jurisdiction is a common law doctrine that guides courts in determining when they
should refrain from or postpone the exercise of their jurisdiction to enable an administrative agency
to answer questions within the agency's expertise. Invoking the doctrine frequently postpones judicial intervention. In many such cases, judicial intervention occurs through judicial review of the
agency's determination. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMIN. LAW TREATISE, ch. 22 (1979). The doctrine has been applied in the Illinois courts. See, e.g., Steward v. Allstate Ins. Co., 92 I11.
App. 3d
637, 415 N.E.2d 1206 (1980); Chicago & Eastern R.R. Co. v. Martin Bros. Container & Timber
Prod. Corp., 87 I11.
App. 3d 327, 408 N.E.2d 1031 (1980); Valiquet v. First Fed. Savings & Loan
Ass'n, 87 I11.
App. 3d 195, 408 N.E.2d 921 (1980).
136. 358 Ill. 239, 193 N.E. 112 (1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935).
137. 32 Ill. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965).
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thorough and efficient system of free schools." It reasoned that school
district employees were acting as agents of the state government and
were themselves under the constitutional mandate to provide public education. The strike conflicted with their constitutional obligation and,
thus, could be enjoined.
In Peters v. South Chicago Community Hospital,'38 the court refused
to extend Redding to enjoin strikes by workers at private, not-for-profit
hospitals. The court held that the Anti-Injunction Act prohibited enjoining the strike. It viewed Redding as grounded on the state constitutional provisions concerning public education. With respect to private
hospitals, the Peters court found no constitutional or statutory provision
providing or implying an exemption from the Anti-Injunction Act.
Given this silence, the injunction was denied.
The Peters analysis of strikes at private, not-for-profit hospitals was
extended to strikes by employees of a county nursing home in County of
Peoria v. Benedict.139 Benedict, however, was severely limited in City of
Pana v. Crowe. 14° The Crowe court interpreted Fenske Bros. to mean that
the Anti-Injunction Act did not apply to illegal strikes. It also read Redding as a case under the Anti-Injunction Act which "rested its opinion
' 141
flatly upon the unlawfulness of a strike by governmental employees,"
and reiterated the rationale that governmental functions may not be impeded and that strikes were inappropriate in the public sector because of
the absence of the profit motive. Although in Benedict the supreme court
had refused to enjoin a public sector strike, the court in Crowe interpreted Benedict as not repudiating the long standing general principle
that public sector strikes were illegal. Where collective bargaining in
health care institutions had met with legislative silence, collective bargaining by several groups of public employees was covered by statute and
in each instance no right to strike had been provided.
The IELRA, after setting forth the clear and present danger standard for strike injunctions declares: "Except as provided for in this subparagraph, the jurisdiction of the court under this Section is limited by"
the Anti-Injunction Act.' 4 2 The language is ambiguous. It could be argued that the provision expressly overrules City of Pana and limits in43
junctions to strikes meeting the clear and present danger standard.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

44 I11.
2d 22, 253 N.E.2d 375 (1969).
47 IlI. 2d 166, 265 N.E.2d 141 (1970), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 929 (1971).
57 Ill. 2d 547, 316 N.E.2d 513 (1974).
Id. at 550, 316 N.E.2d at 514.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, 1713 (Supp. 1983).
One commentator has suggested this interpretation of similar language in an Oregon stat-
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Such argument ignores the provision's wording which speaks only to
court jursidiction "under this Section." At the other extreme, it can be
argued that, under City of Pana, the Anti-Injunction Act does not apply
to illegal strikes and therefore should not bar injunctions against strikes
that do not comply with the IELRA. Such argument, however, ignores
the legislature's rejection of both premises underlying the preexisting judicial declarations that public sector strikes are illegal. In place of the
judicial declaration that governmental functions may never be impeded
by a strike, the legislature has declared that strikes should not impede
governmental functions to the extent that they pose clear and present
dangers to public health and safety. In place of the judicial declaration
that the absence of a profit motive renders public sector strikes inappropriate, the legislature has declared that strikes have a legitimate role to
play in public sector bargaining.
It is clear that the IELRA substantially alters the preexisting law
under the Anti-Injunction Act. Determining the degree of the alteration
necessitates a detailed inquiry into the purposes behind the five requirements for a lawful strike and whether employer actions for injunctions
would further or obstruct those purposes. The need for such inquiry is
reinforced by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
In San Diego Teachers Association v. Superior Court,14 the California Supreme Court held that a school district could not seek to enjoin a
teacher strike without first exhausting its administrative remedies under
the California Education Employment Relations Act (EERA) before the
California Public Employment Relations Board (CPERB). The court
first concluded that CPERB could properly find an illegal strike to be an
unfair labor practice. The use of an illegal pressure tactic could amount
to a refusal to bargain in good faith. A strike prior to completion of the
statutory impasse procedures could amount to a refusal to participate in
the impasse procedure, a separate unfair labor practice under the EERA.
The court next concluded the CPERB could provide relief
equivalent to that which could be provided judicially, because CPERB
was authorized to seek preliminary injunctions restraining the commission of unfair labor practices. Finally, the court concluded that CPERB
had exculsive initial jurisdiction over remedies against strikes that were
ute. Comment, Applying Private Sector Law to the Public Sector Strike in Oregon, 56 OR. L. REV.
263, 267 (1977).
144. 24 Cal. 3d 1, 154 Cal. Rptr. 893, 593 P.2d 838 (1979). Contra, City of Manchester v.
Firefighters Ass'n, 120 N.H. 230, 413 A.2d 577 (1980); cf. United States v. PATCO, 653 F.2d 1134
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981) (relying on express statements during floor debates that
FLRA jurisdiction over illegal strikes was not exclusive).
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unfair labor practices. It found such exclusive jurisdiction both implied
in the comprehensiveness of the statutory scheme and expressed in a specific provision of the statute. It found that the EERA established a policy of relying on good faith collective bargaining rather than injunctions
to prevent strikes. CPERB provided the expertise that a court lacked to
determine whether an injunction would effectively end the strike or
would impede the good faith negotiations necessary to resolve the dispute
with finalty.
San Diego Teachers Association may be contrased with In re Hoboken Teachers Association, 14 5 where the New Jersey Superior Court held
that the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission's
(NJPERC) jurisdiction over unfair labor practices did not preempt the
chancery court's jurisdiction to enjoin an illegal strike. The court observed that the NJPERC had no power to seek or grant preliminary injunctions pending the resolution of unfair labor practice charges. In the
court's view, the statute's failure to provide for such powers was deliberate. All public employee strikes were illegal in New Jersey and considered to be inherently harmful to the public. In most instances,
immediate relief from the strike would be required. Such relief was more
readily available from a court than an administrative agency.
The IELRA authorizes the IELRB to seek preliminary relief in circuit court. 146 The IELRA also rejects the notion that all public employee strikes are so inherently harmful to the public that they require
immediate injunctive relief. Thus, where the requirements for a legal
strike serve purposes directly related to the duties imposed on a union by
the IELRA's unfair labor practice section, primary jurisdiction over the
strike, including the availability of preliminary relief, rests with the
IELRB. Where, however, the requirements serve a purpose other than
reinforcing unfair labor practice duties, immediate and direct employer
access to preliminary relief may be necessary to carry out the legislative
purpose.
The first requirement for a legal strike is representation of the employees by an exclusive representative. The apparent purpose behind this
requirement is the prevention of "wildcat" strikes. 47 The term wildcat
strike usually refers to a strike by employees that has not been authorized
by their union. Where the strike is not conducted by an employee organization, the IELRB would not have unfair labor practice jurisdiction.
145. 141 N.J. Super. 240 (1977).
146. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1716(d) (Supp. 1983).
147. See 83rd Gen. Assem., House Debate on S.B. 536, p. 303 (June 23, 1983); 83rd Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on S.B. 536, p. 316 (May 27, 1983).
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The absence of an employee organization renders the strike uncontrollable and unlikely to be resolved through negotiation. The need for immediate judicial relief is apparent. Such strikes should be enjoinable upon
employer petition in circuit court.
Strikes also might be brought by employee organizations that are
not exclusive bargaining representatives of the employees. Such strikes
may raise serious unfair labor practice issues. For example, the IPLRA
prohibits certain recognitional or organizational picketing and, by inference, accompanying strikes in a manner identical to the NLRA. 148 No
comparable provision is contained in the IELRA because the legislature
believed that such strikes and picketing would not occur in public education. 149 If such activity does occur it might still be an unfair labor practice if it is viewed as restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of
their statutory rights. The IELRB's expertise is required not only to determine whether the activity is an unfair labor practice, but also to determine the appropriate remedy. While the IELRB could properly
conclude that a preliminary injunction was called for, it might also conclude that the strike could be remedied more appropriately by some
other action, such as holding an expedited election. Thus, strikes by unions that are not exclusive representatives of the striking employees must
lie within the IELRB's primary jurisdiction and not be subject to direct
employer actions for injunctions.
The second requirement for a lawful strike is the expiration of any
existing collective bargaining agreement. At first glance this requirement
would appear to be superfluous. The IELRA also requires that every
collective bargaining agreement contain a no strike clause and a grievance and arbitration procedure. 5 0 A strike prior to the expiration of an
existing collective bargaining agreement will be barred by the no strike
clause.
In the private sector employers can obtain injunctions to enforce
contractual no strike clauses.1 5 1 Because the no strike clause is the typical quid pro quo for the grievance procedure, the injunction is necessary
to protect the integrity and exclusivity of that procedure. The policy
favoring arbitration of contract grievances embodied in the Taft-Hartley
Act outweighs the policy against labor injunctions embodied in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Where, however, the dispute underlying the strike is
148. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1610(b)(7) (Supp. 1983).
149. 83rd Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on H.B. 1530, p. 23 (June 27, 1983).
150. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
1710(c) (Supp. 1983).
151. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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not arbitrable, the injunction cannot issue.15 2
The policy favoring arbitration of grievances and disfavoring strikes
which undermine the exclusivity of the grievance procedure is even
stronger under the IELRA. The statute mandates the quid pro quo exchange of a no strike clause for a grievance and arbitration procedure.
Direct employer access to immediate injunctive relief from strikes over
arbitrable issues is clearly implicit in the statutory scheme.
Unlike the IELRA, the IPLRA permits the parties, by mutual
agreement, to exclude grievance and no strike provisions from their contracts. 153 This distinction is subtle but significant. It indicates a legislative determination that no strike clauses, while desireable generally in the
public sector, are indispensible in public education. There is no specific
discussion of this distinction in the legislative history, except for the general policy declaration that a separate regulatory scheme is required by
the uniqueness of the educational calendar and educational work duties.
The basic educational work duty is teaching students. Regardless of
their capacities, all educational employees support this function. The
disruption from strikes in education is different from the disruption from
strikes in other governmental services. A strike occurring during the
middle of a term can disrupt the rapport that had developed between
teachers and their classes. When the strike ends, teachers cannot simply
pick up where they left off but must reestablish this rapport and reorient
their students to the material they had covered prior to the strike. The
statutory mandate that all contracts contain no strike clauses protects the
integrity of not only the grievance procedure but also the educational
process itself. The reaching of agreement provides a guarantee that the
educational process can go forward for the life of the agreement without
disruption. The requirement that the agreement have expired before a
strike will be lawful reinforces this guarantee.1 54 Thus, the availability of
direct employer access to injunctive relief implicit in the statutory
scheme is not limited to strikes over arbitral issues, but encompasses all
strikes undertaken while a collective bargaining agreement is in effect.
The third requirement for a legal strike is the unsuccessful use of
mediation. It is significant that mediation need not be exhausted. Unlike
statutes in other jurisdictions that legalize public employee strikes, 55 the
152. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
153.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, $ 1608 (Supp. 1983).

154. Under the IPLRA, expiration of the existing agreement is not required if the agreement
does not contain a no-strike clause. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, T 1713(d) (Supp. 1983).
155. For example, public employees in Hawaii have a statutory right to strike but may do so
only after the Hawaii PERB declares that an impasse exists, mediation is used for 15 days, followed
by fact finding. If the dispute remains unresolved five days after the fact finding panel issues its

IMPLEMENTING THE IELRA

IELRA imposes no requirement that impasse be declared or fact-finding
be used prior to a strike. When a strike occurs, the mediator is expected
to have already been on the scene and be in a position to help the parties
156
settle the strike as quickly as possible.
The statute envisions good faith efforts to resolve the dispute by mediation before striking. The IELRB has a statutory duty to ensure that
these efforts are made. There is no express provision for IELRB enforcement of the mandatory mediation 15 days prior to the start of the school
year; none is necessary. Mediation is part of the overall process of collective bargaining under the statute. Refusal to engage in good faith mediation is equivalent to refusal to bargain in good faith. Strikes rendered
illegal by inadequate resort to mediation are thus unfair labor practices
within the IELRB's jurisdiction.
The determination of whether mediation was used in good faith
raises subtle issues of fact that require sensitivity to the bargaining process. Courts are poorly equipped to resolve these issues. The IELRB,
however, was created to provide an agency with the expertise to resolve
these issues. Similarly, IELRB expertise is essential to assessing the appropriateness of particular relief for the unfair labor practices. Immediate injunctive relief may not, in every case, further the overall statutory
goals of stability through collective bargaining. Consequently, claims
that strikes occurred without adequate use of mediation must be resolved
by the IELRB. Employers cannot, consistent with the overall statutory
scheme, have direct access to immediate injunctive relief.
The fourth requirement for a lawful strike is that there be at least
five days notice of intent to strike." 5 7 Notice must be given to the emrecommendations, the recommendations are publicly released. Sixty days later, the union is free to
strike. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 89-11(b), 89-12 (1976 & Supp. 1983).
Ohio allows public employees to strike, but requires that the parties first engage in mediation
and then fact finding. The fact finder's recommendations are binding unless rejected by a three-fifths
vote of the employer's governing body or a three-fifths vote of the union membership. If the recommendations are rejected they are publicly released. The union is free to strike seven days later. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4117.14(c), (d) (Page Supp. 1983).
In Oregon, public employees are free to strike only after mediation and fact finding. Mediation
must be used for 15 days. If no agreement is reached fact finding is mandated. The parties have five
days from receipt of the fact finder's recommendations to accept them. If the recommendations are
not accepted, they are publicly released. Thirty days later the union can strike. OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 243.712, 243.722, 243.726 (1983).
156. The legislature believed that good faith mediation would not only prevent many strikes, but
would shorten those strikes that do occur. See supra notes 102-108 and accompanying text. During
the House debates on the IELRA, Representative McPike expressed the legislature's frustration with
the existing system of unregulated bargaining and illegal strikes, observing that the Chicago teacher
strike had gone on for two weeks before mediation was suggested. See supra note 106.
157. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 48,
1713 (Supp. 1983). The only notice of intent to strike requirement found in the private sector is section 8(g) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (1982), which
requires that a union give notice of intent to strike a health care institution "not less than 10 days
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ployer, the regional superintendent, and the IELRB. The notice to the
employer gives the employer time to seek an injunction before the strike
begins if the strike will pose a clear and present danger to the public
health or safety.15 8 In light of the rarity that an education strike will
pose such a danger, failure to give proper notice to the employer does not
call for direct employer access to injunctive relief. Notice to the regional
superintendent facilitates performance of his duties to exercise supervision and control over the school district.159 Failure to give proper notice
does not create a situation requiring direct employer access to injunctive
relief.
Notice to the IELRB enables it to fulfill its statutory mandate to
ensure that mediation is used in good faith prior to a strike. 16° The notice is particularly important if the parties have deferred selection of the
mediator. Inadquate notice undermines the Board's function. Control
over the notice properly rests with the remedial powers of the Board
rather than the injunctive powers of a court.
Inadequate notice thus potentially undermines the bargaining process by ignoring safeguards built into that process. These safeguards protect the public by facilitating the enjoining of dangerous strikes, the
supervision of public school districts, and the IELRB's supervision of the
conduct of bargaining. Inadequate notice is therefore inconsistent with
good faith bargaining. As an unfair labor practice that does not require
direct employer access to immediate injunctive relief, it rests within the
Board's primary jurisdiction.
prior to such action..." It further requires that the notice contain the date and time that the strike
is scheduled to begin, and provides that, once given, the notice may only be extended by written
agreement of both parties. These provisions do not require the union to strike precisely at the moment specified in the notice. The union, however, must act within a reasonable time after the time
specified in the notice. Generally, if the union strikes within 72 hours after the date specified in the
notice and gives at least 12 hours notice of the actual strike time it will comply with section 8(g).
Bio-Medical Applications of New Orleans, Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 432 (1979).
The underlying purpose of section 8(g) is to allow hospitals sufficient time to provide for patient
care in the event of a strike. See generally Kurchko & Fries, Hospital Strikes: Complying with
NLRA Notice Requirements, 9 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 566 (1984); Annot., 43 A.L.R. Fed. 449 (1979).
The strict restrictions on the timing of the strike further this purpose.
In contrast to section 8(g), the IELRA does not expressly require the notice to specify the date
and time that the strike is scheduled to commence, and is silent concerning extensions of the notice.
The purposes of the IELRA's strike notice are different from those of section 8(g). Thus, unlike
section 8(g), the IELRA should not be read as controlling the timing of the strike, once five days
notice has been given.
158. 83rd Gen. Assem., House debate on S.B. 536, p. 301 (June 23, 1983).
159. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122,

3-14 (1983).

160. In contrast, the IPLRA requires the strike notice to be given only to the employer. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 48,
1617(a)(5) (Supp. 1983). The IPLRA also requires that the union request a
mediator, rather than that mediation be used without success before a strike. Id. at 1617(a)(4).
Thus, under the IPLRA there is no need to give notice of intent to strike to the Boards as there is no
duty of prestrike mediation for the Boards to enforce.
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The final requirement for a legal strike is the parties' lack of agreement to submit unresolved issues to interest arbitration. Just as a grievance and arbitration procedure is a statutory quid pro quo for a no strike
clause in the agreement, submission to interest arbitration is a statutory
quid pro quo for not striking in the absence of a contract. Employer
access to immediate injunctive relief is necessary to prevent the strike
from undermining the integrity of the interest arbitration procedure.
Perhaps the most common unprotected strike will be one over demands that do not involve mandatory subjects of bargaining. In such
instances the illegality results not from the strike, per se, but from the
union's insistance to impasse on nonmandatory subjects. 16' Such strikes
clearly fall within the IELRB's unfair labor practice jurisdiction and
should not be the subject of employer initiated injunction actions in
court.
Another issue not expressly addressed in the statute or the rules is
whether unfair labor practice strikes are entitled to special treatment. In
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, t62 the United States Supreme Court held
that a private sector strike to protest unfair labor practices was not
barred by a standard no strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement or the sixty-day notice provision of section 8(d) of the NLRA. The
Court reasoned that the no strike clause, when viewed in the context of
the contract as a whole, was designed to avoid disruptions of production
prompted by efforts to change existing economic relationships or by disputes over alleged breaches of the contract. Although the Court did not
decide whether express language could waive the right to strike, it concluded that such a waiver could not be implied from the general no strike
clause.
The Court held that the sixty-day waiting period of section 8(d) was
applicable only to strikes aimed at terminating or modifying an existing
agreement. The Court found this holding necessary to avoid an incongruous result that would leave employees free to strike to protest em161. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); Lone Star Steel Co. v.
NLRB, 639 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1981). In Lone Star Steel, the
administrative law judge made the following observation concerning a strike over a nonmandatory
subject:
It is argued that the Union bargained to impasse over the application clause and therefore violated Section 8(b)(3). Impasse is a plastic concept and not really material here.
Whether the parties reached an impasse, and if so when, need not be decided. The Union
can strike to force its bargaining position, whether or not there has been an impasse. It
cannot, however, strike to force the Company to accept a nonmandatory subject of bargaining even if there was no impasse. To the extent it is striking to achieve agreement on a
nonmandatory subject, it is refusing to bargain within the meaning of Section 8(b)(3).
United Mine Workers, 231 N.L.R.B. 573, 583 (1977).
162. 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
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ployer unfair labor practices prior to the sixty-day notice period but
would have to waive their right to strike by filing the notice.
Under the IELRA, the contractual no strike clause is mandated by
statute to protect the educational process as well as the bargaining process and grievance procedures. Just as grievances which arise during the
term of a collective agreement must be processed through the grievance
procedure, unfair labor practices arising midterm must be processed
through the unfair labor practice procedures. In light of the broader purpose behind the statutory prohibition of strikes while a collective bargaining agreement is in effect, Mastro Plastic's interpretation of the
private sector no strike clause cannot apply to the IELRA mandated no
strike clause.
Where, however, there is no contract in effect, the statutory scheme
suggests that unfair labor practice strikes are not enjoinable. Clearly, the
strikes occurring when no contract is in effect that most concerned the
legislature were those that posed clear and present dangers to the public
health and safety. Even in these strikes, employer unfair labor practice
can evidence unclean hands and prevent the issuance of injunctions. The
legislature, thus, intended that unions be free to counter employer unfair
labor practices with even the most dangerous strikes.
The statutory pre-strike requirements of unsuccessful use of mediation and of at least five days notice of intent to strike should not apply to
unfair labor practice strikes. Initial resort to mediation is required in an
effort to facilitate a collective bargaining agreement without a strike. Nowhere does the statute suggest that required mediation is intended to resolve unfair labor practices. The notice requirement is intended to
safeguard the collective bargaining process. This process, however, will
have been undermined by the employer's unfair labor practices. There is
no need to notify the employer to facilitate an employer petition for an
injunction if the employer's unfair labor practices would bar the injunction. There also is no need to notify the IELRB to ensure mediation if
the dispute is not subject to the statutory mediation procedures. The
union's need for its strike weapon to counter employer unfair labor practices is greatest when the employees are not protected by an existing contract. The availability of that weapon is implicit in the statutory
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scheme. 1

163. Cf. id. at 286.
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UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

The IELRA draws heavily from the NLRA in its unfair labor practice provisions. Unlike the NLRA, however, the IELRA makes it an
unfair labor practice to refuse to abide by a binding arbitration award. I64
The IELRA's legislative history is silent concerning the meaning of this
provision. The IPLRA contains no comparable provision. The IPLRA
expressly provides that arbitration awards are enforceable in accordance
with the Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act,1 6 5 a provision not contained
in the IELRA. The effect of these varying provisions would appear to
make arbitration awards interpreting contracts negotiated under the IPLRA enforceable and reviewable in court, while making arbitration
awards interpreting contracts negotiated under the IELRA enforceable
and reviewable by the IELRB. Placing initial review of education arbitration awards with the IELRB is consistent with the general legislative
concern that the uniqueness of the educational calendar, work duties and
patterns of bargaining requires a separate regulatory scheme administered by an agency with particular expertise.
The IELRA's unfair labor practice procedures differ markedly from
those of the NLRA. 166 The IELRA expressly authorizes employers and
unions to file charges but is silent on whether employees can file. The
IELRA is also silent concerning who prosecutes an unfair labor practice
complaint. Finally, unlike the NLRA which requires reasonable cause
for issuance of a complaint, the IELRA requires that the charge "state
an issue of law or fact."
67
The IELRB rules extend the right to file a charge to employees.
The rule properly implements the statute. No express statutory grant of
standing is needed for filing a charge.' 68 Because protection of employee
rights is a principle purpose of the statute, denial of employee standing
should not be lightly inferred.
An examination of the state of the law at the time the IELRA was
enacted defeats any inference that employees lack standing. The Illinois
Office of Collective Bargaining, the only preexisting agency comparable
to the IELRB, had held that an employer lacked standing to charge a
union with coercing employees in the exercise of their rights. 169 Such
164. ILL.

165.

REV. STAT.

ch. 48,

1714(a)(8), (b)(6) (Supp. 1983).

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, t 1608 (Supp. 1983).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 5 1715 (Supp. 1983).

166.
167. 80 I11.Adm. Code § 1120.2(a).
168. The IPLRA does not specify who may file a charge, but speaks only of "Whenever it is
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
charged that any person has engaged in ... any unfair labor practice.
1611(a)(Supp. 1983).
169. Illinois Department of Personnel and AFSCME, Case No. ULP-80-158-OCB (Ill. Off. of

CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW

charges, according to OCB,could only be filed by employees. By prohibiting in the IELRA union unfair labor practices to protect employee
rights, the legislature necessarily conferred on employees standing to file
charges. The legislature, however, went further and rejected the OCB
approach by expressly providing for charges to be filed by unions and
employers. Thus, the statutory provision in question is an expansion of,
rather than a limitation on, standing to file charges.
The IELRB's proposed rules asserted a prosecutorial function in unfair labor practice cases. 170 The permanent rules dropped this provision,
leaving prosecution to the charging party. In light of its decision not to
prosecute, the IELRB cannot equate its "issue of law or fact" standard
for issuing a complaint with the NLRB's reasonable cause standard. The
purpose of the IELRB's investigation is not to build a prosecutor's case.
Rather, it is to determine whether, in light of the evidence proffered, a
hearing is required.
In Lake Zurich School District #95 and AFSCME, 171 the IELRB
held that, for a complaint to issue, "the investigation must disclose adequate credible statements, facts, or documents, which, if substantiated
and not rebutted in a hearing, would constitute sufficient evidence to support a finding of a violation."' 172 In Lake Zurich, AFSCME alleged that
the School District subcontracted its custodial and maintenance services
because of AFSCME's organizing activity. The investigation disclosed
that AFSCME notified the District superintendent that it represented a
majority of the custodial and maintenance employees and requested recognition on January 9, 1984. Subcontracting these services was first considered by the District School Board's Community Advisory Committee
on January 24, 1984. Evidence submitted by the District during the investigation, however, showed that the District superintendent did not advise the School Board of the recognition request until January 26. The
evidence also set out the District's economic difficulties and showed that
subcontracting custodial and maintenance services was part of a series of
actions aimed at economizing. Finally, the evidence showed that the
District had subcontracted these services in the past and that the District
had also voluntarily recognized and negotiated with a union representing
its custodial and maintenance employees in the past.
The IELRB concluded that, in light of the employer's evidence, the
Coll. Barg., Feb. 6, 1981). OCB was created to administer Executive Order 6 which gave collective
bargaining rights to employees within the executive branch of state government.
170. 8 Il.Admin. Reg. 7656, 7661 (1984).
171. Case No. 84-CA-0003 (IELRB, Nov. 30, 1984).
172. Id. at 2.
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suspicious timing of the decision to subcontract, standing alone, did not
raise an issue of law or fact to warrant a complaint. The IELRB appears
to consider the issue of law or fact standard analogous to the standards
for evaluating motions for summary judgment. In Lake Zurich, the uncontradicted evidence explained the suspicious timing of the decision to
subcontract. In the absence of a history of anti-union animus, there was
no issue of material fact concerning the motivation behind the employer's
decision.
This approach is appropriate in light of the nonprosecutorial role of
the investigation. The investigation thus serves to screen out those
charges that do not warrant a hearing, thereby saving the respondent and
the Board from unnecessary expense.
CONCLUSION

The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act draws many of its
provisions from the National Labor Relations Act and public employment relations acts of other states. The IELRA also contains several
innovative provisions, including its definitions of supervisors and managers, its voluntary recognition procedures, and its reliance on strikes in
resolving collective bargaining impasses. Despite its express innovations,
many issues will require a probing beyond the Act's face to find answers
implicit in its overall scheme for regulating collective bargaining in public education. This article has suggested some of those answers that will
be needed as the IELRB, the courts and the parties implement the Act in
the years ahead.
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